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Federal income tax reform is much talked about these days. No
longer the sole province of the person with a professional interest in
the tax system, tax reform is discussed, at some level or other, by people in every walk of life. This recent popularity is due largely to the
widespread unpopularity of the current system. This popularity is also
responsible, unfortunately, for making large-scale, reflective, and systemically coherent reform highly unlikely, and for ensuring that frequent, politically motivated, piecemeal legislative change will
continue. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 probably illustrates the most
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to be hoped for in the present climate.1 Nonetheless, talk of real reform will surely persist, and theoreticians of tax policy will continue to
do the hard work that ought to underlie tax reform.
Despite the skepticism revealed by the above remarks, this article,
too, is a plea for reform. It is not, however, directed at the ills that
have stirred public discontent and made tax reform such a popular
topic. Instead, it addresses the conceptual features that characterize
the federal income tax system as a system. I am interested in changing
the way we think about certain fundamental aspects of any income tax
system and thereby in clarifying the way we describe, explain, understand, and argue about our own system, whatever it may look like at a
particular time. Call this an argument for conceptual reform.
Serious normative discussion about our tax system typically falls
into one of two broad spheres. The first is concerned principally with
the interpretation of existing law. Such discussions are normative because they attempt to establish how a particular circumstance or sort
of circumstance ought to be treated by the tax law as it in fact exists.
This sort of normative discussion is very common, since a salient characteristic of federal income tax law is the frequent opportunity for disagreement about the details of its application. Arguments about the
actual intent or content of the Code, Regulations, administrative positions, and case law fall within this category.
The second sphere of discussion is more obviously normative, encompassing accounts of what the tax law ought to be. Usually these
fall under the broad rubric of discussions of "tax policy." In this
group I include discussions of the hard questions surrounding social
and economic goals, political expediency, administrability, and other
questions concerning the proper role in society of the tax rules, their
effects, or both. I conceive of policy questions as those focusing on
what makes a good system or good rule or set of rules within a system.
Policy discussions can concentrate on asking what the goals of the set
of tax rules ought to be as well as on asking how best to implement
particular goals.
The distinction between discussions that purport to be about how
existing law should be interpreted and those that purport to be about
1. For a brief and characteristically wise account of the nature of the reform achieved by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, see Bittker, Tax Reform - Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 44
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11 (1987). For a lively account of the background to the 1986 legislation,
see Chirelstein, Back from the Dead How PresidentReaganSaved the Income Tax, 14 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 207 (1986). For an analysis of the prodigious rate of recent tax reform, see
Doernberg & McChesney, On theAcceleratingRate andDecreasingDurabilityof Tax Reform, 71
MINN. L. REv. 913 (1987).
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what the law ought to be is rough at best,2 and it is not my intention to
make overmuch of it. Indeed, discussions within each sphere often
make use of arguments from the other. Thus, for example, it is com-

mon practice to invoke fairness in an argument for reading the Code
(or legislative history or administrative pronouncements or case law)

one way rather than another. Similarly, an argument that something
constitutes good policy may make persuasive use of the claim that current law can be interpreted in a particular way.

Normative discussions of both sorts sometimes rely on claims
about the internal coherence of the tax system itself. Arguments for or

against a particular interpretation or policy frequently are based on
concerns for the internal coherence or rationality of the system. Professor Wayne Barnett's celebrated amicus brief in Commissioner v.
Tufts 3 provides an instructive example.
In Tufts the Supreme Court was asked to determine the amount
realized by a taxpayer who had sold property subject to a nonrecourse
mortgage whose face value exceeded the fair market value of the prop-

erty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
held that the amount realized was limited to the fair market value of
the property. The government argued that the amount realized for the
asset included the full face value of the assumed mortgage. The gov-

ernment's argument was based on the view that the Crane4 rule's inclusion of an assumed loan's face value in a seller's amount realized
and its corresponding inclusion of the amount of a purchase money
mortgage in an asset's basis should be generalized to apply to the unusual case where the value of the property is less than the outstanding
amount of the mortgage.5 The Supreme Court overruled the Fifth
2. Some might deny even the possibility of such a distinction on the ground that law can be
read or interpreted to say almost anything the interpreter desires, but that sort of analysis seems
ill-suited to interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.
3. Brief for.Amicus Curiae,Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (No. 81-1536). Barnett's position was rejected by the Court but was accorded respect unusual for an amicus brief,
The majority opinion devotes a footnote to describing his argument and says that, "[a]lthough
this indeed could be a justifiable mode of analysis, it has not been adopted by the Commissioner."
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310-11 n.11 (1983). Justice O'Connor, concurring, endorsed Barnett's view in theory, saying, "were we writing on a slate clean except for the decision
in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)," she would take Barnett's approach. Tufts, 461
U.S. at 317 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Barnett's brief has also provoked unusual interest among
commentators. See, ag., M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 234 (1985); Andrews, On
Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949 (1983); Lurie, New Ghostsfor Old - Crane Footnote 371s Dead (Or
Is It?), 2 AM. J. TAX POLY. 89 (1983).
4. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Whether the Crane rule should be generalized to apply to this kind of circumstance was
put into doubt in footnote 37 of the Crane opinion itself. There, in a celebrated piece of dictum,
the Court wrote:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor
who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a
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Circuit and adopted the government's position.
Barnett's amicus brief argued that the issue had been miscast by
the government and that it was a mistake to view the case simply as
presenting the question of how much the seller had realized for the
asset upon its sale. Instead, he argued, the transaction should be
viewed as two dispositions and the "amount-realized" question should
be asked for each. Thus, the seller is indeed selling the property, but
he is also disposing of a liability. Each disposition has an associated
gain or loss. Any gain associated with the asset is capital gain, subject,
at the time of Tufts (and probably soon again), to a preferential tax
rate, while any gain associated with relief from the liability is ordinary
income. The Tufts facts suggest a capital loss on the sale of the asset
and an ordinary gain as a result of the liability relief.
Barnett's argument is interesting in part because he maintains that
the law, properly interpreted, does in fact require the kind of bifurcation he describes and because he gives as evidence for that claim an
argument that appeals to the coherence and rationality of the system:
A rationalsystem for measuring income also requires, however, that all
receipts and expenditures be accounted for at some time and hence that
those that are not finally accounted for when they occur be kept in a
suspense account so that proper account can be taken of them at another
time. In the case of an asset, the amount that needs to be kept track of
(the unaccounted-for prior expenditures) has by statute been given a
name - it is the taxpayer's "basis" for the asset (§ 1012) - and the
necessity of having such an account is therefore familiar. But there is
obviouslyjust as much need to keep track of a taxpayer's unaccounted-for
prior receipts 6with respect to a liability, and that amount too needs to
have a name.
Thus, Barnett appeals to the coherence and rationality of the system as a justification for his interpretation of the law. Yet, only if one
assumes that the tax system is in fact consistently coherent and rational, or if a tax system (or at least our tax system) ought to be coherent and rational, can the requirements of rationality be a reason for
accepting Barnett's interpretation. The first proposition is clearly
false. The second is a normative claim and itself requires justification.
An appeal to internal systemic coherency or rationality does not, by
itself, provide a reason - sufficient or otherwise - either for interdifferent problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or

transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case.
Crane, 331 U.S. at 14, n.37. The first case directly to address the issue was Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), which held that the taxpayer's
gain was not limited by the fair market value of the abandoned property. Millar, 577 F.2d at
215-16. For a brief, but clear and illuminating, discussion of this part of the background to
Tufts, see Andrews, supra note 3, at 950-52.
6. Brief for Amicus Curiae,supra note 3, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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preting the tax law in a particular way or for making a policy judgment. Moreover, any argument for the claim would itself be an
instance of a normative discussion about what the law should be
rather than a discussion about how the law as it is should be interpreted. As it happens, Barnett neither makes nor acknowledges the
7
need for such an argument.
Barnett is not unusual in this respect. Even people who rely on
claims about systemic coherence or rationality when arguing for a particular interpretation of tax law or for some tax policy do not directly
confront the question whether the system should be rational or coherent. Yet given the obvious lack of consistency and coherence among
the hundreds of provisions in the current Internal Revenue Code and
the piecemeal character of tax legislative activity, it is an argument
that must not seem self-evident to those who formulate our tax law.
To what extent, if any, should internal coherence and rationality be
goals of an income tax system?
Having asked the question, this article does not purport to answer
it.8 It does, however, try to do some of the work that a serious answer
would require. To that end, it focuses on the underlying structure on
which the content of the tax law hangs. By isolating the structure of
tax systems generally, perhaps we can come to understand and describe our own system better, and to begin to develop a more useful
and richer conceptual vocabulary that is independent of concerns
about the content of the tax base. Only then can we be more selfconscious about exactly what coherence and rationality in our tax system might mean, and about the possible tradeoffs between that value
and other values that we might want the system to embody. Further,
we should gain a better understanding of the structure of our arguments about the content of the income tax system.
I begin, then, with the observation that systemic coherence and
rationality are not necessary qualities of a tax system. Are there,
nonetheless, any structural features that must, as a matter of logic,
underlie any tax system? On examination, there are a few structural
requirements that are necessarily common to any tax system. In Part
7. This may be somewhat unfair to Barnett since he only speaks here of rationality and not of
coherence. If it is rational - as indeed it might be - to talk about its being rational for a tax
system to be comprised of an incoherent collection of rational parts, then Barnett need only
argue that the component parts of the tax system ought to be rational. He does not make this

argument either. Moreover, at another point in his brief he writes, "And that, of course, is just
as it should and must be" given the treatment of the 'opening' transaction as an independent
liability-creating transaction, no other treatment of the 'closing' transaction would be coherent."
Id. at nn.7-8 (emphasis added).
8. Nor does it argue for or against particular applications or interpretations of current federal
income'tax law, nor make recommendations about what the content of the tax law ought to be.
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I of this article I examine those requirements. I show that by isolating
the necessary structure of a tax system from its particular content or
goals, we can better understand the role played within the federal system of certain of its most characteristic features. In particular, I trace
the function of the realization requirement for the recognition of income and distinguish it from another sort of function that could lead
to the recognition of income within an income tax system. This second function is a corrective one, and it is achieved in the federal system by a mechanism I call "reconciliation."
Reconciliation has considerable descriptive power within the federal system. I show this in Part II by examining, as examples, three
general circumstances that are well described as instances of reconciliation. Two of the three lead to the recognition of income, yet neither
can be properly described in terms of realization. 9
Finally, in Part III, I argue that the notion of reconciliation can
play an important role in normative discussions about the federal income tax system. This role has two parts. First, reconciliation describes actual phenomena within the federal system with more
coherence and rationality than traditional vocabulary and concepts allow. Those who accept coherence within a tax system as a value will
attach some value to that description. Second, describing those phenomena in that way implies certain further descriptions of other parts
of the tax system. Sometimes, however, these further descriptions do
not fit the law as it actually is, and so the overall coherence of the
system will turn out to be less than it would have been if the law had
been otherwise. In such cases, a desire for coherence above all else
would indicate that the law ought to be changed. However, other,
sometimes competing, values such as administrability or equity, can be
relevant to determining whether the law really should be changed.
When values compete, one will have to choose between particular aims
on the one hand and the coherence and rationality of the system on
the other. My purpose here is not to recommend a particular choice
among these options, but rather to establish that self-conscious articulation and exploration of those values and their importance should be
a goal of normative discussion about our income tax system. In Part
9. My interest in this sort of inquiry stems from my observation of our current system's
inability to account easily for amounts that it includes in taxable income under the rubric of the
tax benefit rule. The system seemed to struggle unduly to describe in its own terms what seemed
to be a reasonably plausible, common-sense principle. It appeared to be missing the explicit
conceptual apparatus that it should have for that task. In an earlier paper I suggested a conceptual framework within which the tax benefit rule could be more easily understood and described
as a feature of the federal income tax system. See White, An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MICH. L. REv. 486 (1983).
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III, I illustrate this argument by showing that, in contrast to the usual
description, reconciliation allows us to describe the tax treatment of
simple borrowing in a way that is internally consistent and coherent. I
discuss the implications of this coherent description for the analysis of
purchase money mortgages and for the central issue in Tufts. Ironically, although my analysis does suggest the kind of transactional bifurcation advocated by Barnett, the requirements of rationality turn
out to be somewhat different from what he claims, and to come closer
to the current system than we might expect. There are important respects, however, in which the analysis is not consistent with current
practice. Instead of arguing that the law ought either to be reformed
or differently interpreted, I explore one significant administrative cost
of implementing the analysis and suggest that a full articulation of the
issue in Tufts would be more complicated than indicated by either
Barnett or the Supreme Court.
I.

THE BAsIc STRUCTURE OF ANY TAX SYSTEM

Any tax system must make some effort to determine what is potentially taxable. If it is a system that purports to tax income, it need not
define "income," but it must nonetheless offer some means of identifying that which might be taxed. 10 Once something has been deemed
potentially taxable, a system has three possible responses: it can tax
the item or amount currently, it can tax it later, or it can exempt it
from taxation.1
No tax system need employ all three basic responses, much less
any of their variations. 12 The simplest system would first determine
10. I use the phrase "potentially taxable amount" rather than the word "income" to designate that which falls within the purview of a taxing system. This is because all that is logically
required of the structure of any income tax system, as of any tax system of whatever description,
is some means of dividing the world into those items that might possibly be taxed and those items
that could not be.
11. Actually, there is a fourth general possibility - some combination of the other options
- but since it is clearly a derivative of the others, I shall not isolate the idea of an allocation
scheme in the following discussion.
12. Items that satisfy the threshold criterion (whatever that may be) must be reacted to by
the system in one of the three basic ways. Those items that do not (and there need not be any of
them), simply elicit no reaction (although this effect, of course, is equivalent to being excluded).
A system with a clear definition of "income" might use that definition as the threshold criterion
for dividing the world. Any system (like the federal income tax system) with no clear definition
of "income," could employ other criteria to make the division - or it could employ none, and
make no division at all. A system might well operate with some implicit sense of what should be
included in "income," and its reactions to the items it considers could be arranged so as to tax
only those items deemed to be "income." (In fact, the federal income tax system may operate to
some extent in this last way. In the federal system, taxable income is determined in part by
deducting from gross income those expenses that it is thought appropriate to net against revenue
included in gross income. For an interesting criticism of the idea that tax accounting should
accept this sort of matching as a central principle, see Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as
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that something is potentially taxable and then immediately tax it. Perhaps some sort of periodic accounting convention would be instituted

for administrative ease, but the principal inquiry in such a system
would be what to tax. 13 The only significant additional complications
in such a system would involve the quantification and valuation of
14
what was to be taxed.
A more complicated system might allow either of two reactions to
the determination that something is potentially taxable: tax it now or
tax it later. As before, if something were deemed to be within the aegis
of the tax system it would be taxed, but in this sort of a system the
timing could vary. Various sorts of criteria might be used to determine which reaction was appropriate: random choice, alternating reactions, or reactions designed to bring about a particular state of
affairs. The many examples of the latter include the desire to maximize revenue, administrative ease, social welfare, aid or comparative
advantage to some group or other, and economic parity among tax-

payers. Here the system must answer both the questions what to tax
and when to tax it.
A system that admits of the third possible response and reacts to
the determination that something is potentially taxable by taxing it
currently, taxing it later, or by not taxing it after all is significantly

more complex than either of the first two types. The same range of
criteria is available to guide its choices as in a system with two possible

reactions, but, because exclusion is now a possibility, everything that is
potentially taxable need not eventually be taxed. This means that the
system can use exclusion to tailor its tax base and that the determination that something is potentially taxable is not necessarily determinaa Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAx Rv.1 (1984). But see Crane, Matching and the Income
Tax Base: The Special Case of Tax Exempt Income, 5 AM. J. TAX POLY. 191, 204 n.18 (1986).)
In any event, however, labeling everything that falls within the scope of some income tax system
"income" for the purpose of the system would be misleading. Moreover, the term itself is so
fraught with meaning that it seems ill-advised to use it schematically.
13. A system could answer the question "what is potentially taxable?" in an infinite variety of
ways. Possible potentially taxable items include: salary, free time, bagels consumed, use of one's
own winter jacket, and impacted wisdom teeth. Moreover, the what to tax question is inextricably tied to the question of whom to tax. Thus, the examples might include: a taxpayer's own
salary, a taxpayer's spouse's free time, bagels consumed by the taxpayer's family, use of any
jacket by a taxpayer's nephew, and incidents of impacted wisdom teeth on the taxpayer's block
(or on some block which the taxpayer has never seen). See infra note 39 and accompanying text;
see also McIntyre, Implicationsof US Tax Reform forDistributiveJustice, 5 AuSrr. TAX F. 219,
239-40 (1988).
14. Quantification is a different issue from valuation. It arises because the world is not naturally described in numerical amounts, and a tax system would seem to require some common
denominator for quantifying whatever is to be taxed. Valuation involves the actual assignment of
value to whatever is to be taxed. Quantification and valuation issues can both be intractable, and
I have no intention of minimizing either their importance or their difficulty.
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tive of what will in fact be taxed. The increased flexibility offered by
the possibility of exclusion would serve-no purpose if the determination of what was potentially taxable fully satisfied the normative goals
for the tax base. As a result, a system that makes use of exclusion in
addition to deferral must answer an additional question: whether to
tax that which it has deemed potentially taxable. The what to tax
question is no longer fully answered by the determination of what is
potentially taxable; instead, it is only answered as the whether to tax
question is answered. Indeed, it may only be completely answered after the timing issues implicit in the when to tax question are fully resolved. The federal income tax system is a good example of this
phenomenon. It does not, although its authors could have allowed it
to, rely on a definition of "income" (perhaps a Haig-Simons standard) 15 to determine what is potentially taxable and then use current
taxation, deferral, and exclusion as mechanisms for departing from the
standard established by the definition. Instead, it uses the responses
themselves (particularly deduction and exclusion) to achieve something very loosely approaching a standard for income.
The crucial observation is that the three possible responses to what
has been deemed potentially taxable provide a crude model for a tax
system of whatever degree of complexity. By themselves, they neither
prescribe nor proscribe any criteria for their application. Nor do they
entail any requirement that the criteria chosen be applied consistently. 16 Thus, whatever treatment an income tax system ultimately
accords anything it identifies as potentially taxable can be described in
terms of current taxation, deferral, or exclusion. A system need not
determine at the point of the item's characterization as potentially taxable which of the three treatments it will receive. That decision may
be deferred, but ultimately the item will either be taxed or excluded. 17
Any criteria could be employed by an income tax system to decide
whether to tax currently something deemed potentially taxable, to defer its taxation, or to exclude it from taxation. A system could be
more or less systematic in its selection and articulation of these criteria. Doubtless at some point the taxing mechanism would cease prop15. The Haig-Simons definition of income is an ideal much favored by economists. Henry
Simons' classic statement of the definition: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of(l) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." H.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
16. Two distinct sorts of consistency might be required. The first is that the criteria treat the
same item in the same way in identical circumstances, the second is that similar items or circumstances be accorded at least similar treatment. A system would seem to require consistency of the
first sort. It is consistency of the second type that I am referring to in the text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 38-60.
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erly to be called a "system" if the choices about recognition were
thoroughly ad hoc, but there is an enormous range within which a
system could operate. 18 In the United States and elsewhere there

might, of course, be constitutional or other legal constraints on the
content of an income tax system, but such limitations bear on the system's legitimacy, not on its status as a system.19
A system might well include some means of keeping track of how
potentially taxable amounts have been treated.2 0 This would seem
particularly desirable if the system were designed so as not to tax any
potentially taxable amount more than once. Income tax systems gen-

erally are characterized by this feature and, indeed, it may usefully
distinguish an income tax from a wealth tax, a property tax, or a re-

ceipts tax. In the federal income tax, basis is the mechanism used to
keep track of what has been taxed and what has not been. 21 Nonetheless, a tracking mechanism is not a necessary feature of a tax system even of an income tax system.
The essential structure of an income tax system, then, requires

only a mechanism or mechanisms for identifying what is potentially
taxable and a mechanism or mechanisms for determining whether that
amount is to be recognized at the point of its identification, to have its

recognition deferred, or to be given permanent nonrecognition treatment. The system could, of course, provide that all potentially taxable
amounts are to be treated in the same specific way. In that case, there
would not be any need for any separate mechanisms to determine

whether or when to tax them. It is easy to lose sight of this fundamental structural simplicity when confronting a system as complex as the
one embodied in the current Internal Revenue Code. Nevertheless, for
18. For example, a system could provide for the immediate recognition of everything potentially taxable, yet exclude (or permit the deduction of) all (potentially taxable) salary earned by
an employee of an American automobile manufacturer (or, better yet, by a university professor).
Or it might provide for a ten-year deferral of the recognition of one third of all potentially taxable
amounts credited to each taxpayer born on the same day as the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service (a date that would doubtless vary from Commissioner to Commissioner) and for
the nontaxation of all potentially taxable amounts attributed to 100,000 (or 1000 or 10) taxpayers
chosen, freely with no constraints whatever, by the head elephant keeper at the National Zoo.
19. See generally Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972); Norton, The Limitless FederalTaxing Power, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 591 (1985).

20. I am indebted to Charlotte Crane for forcing me to focus on this point at this point.
21. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988) defines a property's "basis" as its "cost" to the taxpayer. I.R.C.
§ 1016 (1988) sets forth rules for adjusting basis upward or downward to reflect additional costs
incurred by the taxpayer with respect to the property or returns to the taxpayer of the costs
previously included. See infra note 101. Adjusted basis is the operative amount wherever the
Code makes use of basis. William Andrews aptly describes adjusted basis as reflecting "the
whole history of the tax treatment of an item." Andrews, supra note 3, at 954; see also Crane,
supra note 12, at 217-23.
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reasons that I trust will become increasingly clear, it is instructive to
examine the underlying fundament.
A.

The Role of Realization

In the federal income tax system, one mechanism used for determining that a potentially taxable amount will be currently recognized
is the notion of realization. Articulating the exact content of the con-

cept may well be impossible (if indeed there is a single coherent concept),22 but its function in the structure of the system is apparent.

Simply put, our system 2 3 generally regards the realization of a poten-

tially taxable amount as the occasion for its recognition. It does not,
however, always recognize potentially taxable amounts when they are

realized.2 4 Nor, as long as a system has some means of determining
how to treat potentially taxable amounts, is there any systemic reason

why realization as intended by the federal system need play any role in
the recognition/deferred recognition/nonrecognition determination.

These observations about the general structural requirements of an
income tax system seem almost too obvious to be worth making. They
become important, however, because they were so little understood in
the early evolution of our system. As a consequence, that system became enormously complex without the degree of structural self-con-

sciousness that one might have hoped for. This complexity, in turn,
obscures both the actual relationships between central features of the
22. See,

eg.,

1 B. BITrKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND

GIFrs § 5.2 (2d ed. 1989); M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON 5 (5th ed. 1988);
R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME pt. I (rev. ed. 1945).
23. I emphasize "our" because an income tax system need not rely on or even have a realization requirement.
24. Several Internal Revenue Code provisions defer the taxation of realized amounts. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 351 (West Supp. 1990) (exchange of appreciated property for stock or securities of
equal value in a corporation controlled by the transferor); I.R.C. § 354 (1988) (exchange of appreciated stock or securities in a corporate reorganization); I.R.C. § 721 (1988) (exchange of
appreciated property for partnership interest); I.R.C. § 1031 (West Supp. 1990) (like-kind exchanges of appreciated business or investment property); I.R.C. § 1033 (1988) (involuntary conversion of appreciated property); I.R.C. § 1034 (1988) (sale of appreciated principal residence
combined with purchase of new principal residence); I.R.C. § 1035 (1988) (certain exchanges of
life insurance and annuity contracts); I.R.C. § 1036 (1988) (certain exchanges of stock for stock
in the same corporation); I.R.C. § 1041 (1988) (transfers of appreciated property between
spouses or incident to divorce). Elliott Manning observed to me that, as Andrews points out,
some of these deferral provisions allow us to finesse difficult realization issues by postponing the
question of whether income has been realized until it is no longer difficult. See Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1130-31 (1974).
Other Code provisions exclude realized amounts from taxation altogether. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 71(c) (1988) (child support payments); § 101 (certain death benefits); § 102 (gifts, inheritances,
devises); § 103 (interest on certain government obligations); § 104 (certain compensation for personal injury and sickness); § 112 (certain armed forces combat pay); § 117 (certain scholarships);
§ 119 (meals or lodging furnished for an employer's convenience); § 121 (gain on sale of principal
residence by an individual aged 55 or older); § 132 (certain employee fringe benefits).
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Code and the fact that there are a few structural requirements. One of
these requirements is the need for a mechanism or mechanisms
whereby a system can determine when and whether to tax that which
it deems potentially taxable. I am not, in this article, going to address
directly the issues surrounding the choice of what to deem potentially
taxable, but it is through its response to the determination that something is potentially taxable that any system prescribes whether and, if
so, when, the item will be taxed.

Realization was first articulated by the Supreme Court as a condition of taxability in 1920 in Eisner v. Macomber.2 5 Few transactions
are as famous as Mrs. Macomber's receipt of a stock dividend from

Standard Oil, and no one who has borne with me thus far can have

26
avoided acquiring more than passing acquaintance with that case. It
is repeatedly cited both as the case that held that the Constitution
imposed limitations on what could be deemed to constitute income 27
and as the case that actually tried to spell out a definition of "income."' 28 Both the notion of defining income for tax purposes and the
notion of grounding that definition in the Constitution now strike us as
quaint, and the case seems to be preserved largely for its antiquarian
value. 29 I think, however, that its actual legacy is greater than is commonly thought.
25. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
26. On January 1, 1916, Standard Oil Corporation issued a 50% stock dividend to Mrs.
Macomber and the other Standard Oil stockholders as a result of its transfer of an equivalent par
amount from its surplus account to its capital account. Of this amount, 18.07% represented
surplus earned between March 1, 1913 (the effective date of the sixteenth amendment), and the
date of distribution. Therefore, when Mrs. Macomber received 1100 shares of the new common
stock in the distribution, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed income tax on her
"income" of $19,877, an amount equal to 18.07% of the par value of the total stock she received.
Mrs. Macomber paid the tax under protest but lost her appeal to the Commissioner. She then
sued for a refund, contending that the Revenue Act of 1916, which provided that stock dividends
constituted income taxable under the Act, was unconstitutionally taxing her Standard Oil stock
dividend as income.
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the stock dividend was not income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment because a mere growth of value in a capital investment did not
constitute income. To be income, the gain had to proceed from capital, be severed from it, and
be received by Mrs. Macomber for her own separate use or benefit. Since the stock dividend
represented undistributed corporate earnings, the Court declared that the Revenue Act of 1916
unconstitutionally required that stock dividends be taxed as income.
27. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 211. See, eg., W. ANDREws, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 123-24 (3d ed. 1985); B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.60 (1980 & Supp. 1989); M. GnATz, supra note 3,
at 201.
28. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207. See eg., W. ANDREws, supranote 27, at 212; M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at 8-9; M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at 110.
29. The Macomber result is encompassed today by § 305 of the Code. However, § 305 limits
the extent to which stock dividends are nontaxable. For example, a stock dividend is fully taxable if the shareholder can elect whether to receive it either in stock or property. I.R.C.
§ 305(b)(1) (1988).
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The task the Court set itself in Macomber was to discover what
"income" meant in common parlance. The Court interpreted the sixteenth amendment as using the word in its ordinary sense and thought
its task was to give "only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as
that used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the
Amendment. ' 30 This general view had been articulated two years earlier by Learned Hand in United States v. Oregon-Washington Railroad
and Navigation Co. 3 1 The meaning of "income" in the sixteenth
amendment, Hand wrote, is "to be gathered from the implicit assumptions of its use in common speech."' 32 The Macomber Court attempted
to do so:
Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruingto capital, not a
growth 6r increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceedingfrom the property, severedfrom
the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived," that is received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his
separate use, benefit and disposal; - that is33income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.
Here, the Macomber Court was making not as much a constitutional
claim as a linguistic one. To be sure, the decision gave constitutional
status to the requirement that gain from property be realized, but that
status was presumably derived from the Court's finding about the ordinary meaning of "income," rather than the other way around. If the
ordinary understanding of the word had been different, the content of
Macomber's constitutional requirement should have differed accordingly. Realization was important to the Court because they viewed it
as part of what people meant when they spoke about income. Thus, it
would seem that the content of the concept of realization could, in
principle at least, evolve as the language evolved.
Although Eisner v. Macomber has long since ceased to be important as a source of a definition of income or as constitutional interpre30. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206-07. The Court noted that economists distinguish between

"capital" and "income" in various terms, including likening "capital" to a tree or a piece of land
with the resulting fruit or crop constituting the "income." However, the Court viewed the case
at hand as requiring only an "ordinary" definition of income. The Court cited as examples of its
"ordinary" definitional approach two earlier excise tax cases, Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v.
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913), and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros, 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918), in
which the Court had rejected "theoretical" distinctions between capital and income for a definition in its "natural and obvious" sense. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207.
The Court relied on this same "common speech" approach in subsequent cases as well. See,
e.g., Merchants' Loan & Trust v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) (income given its "commonly understood meaning," not as defined by "lexicographers or economists").
31. 251 F. 211, 212 (2d Cir. 1918).
32. 251 F. at 212.
33. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207.
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tation, 34 the sense that realization is intimately tied to the meaning of
"taxable income" has survived. Although some writers are careful to
refer to realization as an administrative rule intended to establish the
time for taxation, 35 others write of it, at least implicitly, as a requirement of taxability. 36 Possibly because the effort to define income for
purposes of the tax system has been dropped, often no clear line is
drawn between the part of the phrase "taxable income" that is concerned with what might be taxed (the potentially taxable amounts) and
the part that is concerned first with whether and then with when it is
taxed. From the point of view of understanding the structure of an
income tax system, the difference is crucial.
As a theoretical matter, of course, unless a requirement of realization is built into an income tax system's very conception of taxable
income, a potentially taxable amount need not be realized to become
taxable income. 37 It may be, however, that amounts which are potentially taxable within the system must be realized to be taxed. If a system conditions taxability on realization (or on anything else for that
matter), while nonetheless maintaining that the basic notion of potential taxability is independent of realization (or independent of that
"anything else"), it necessarily has a concept of taxable income distinct from its concept of potential taxability. My discussion throughout reflects this distinction.
The taxonomy of the relationship in the federal income tax system
between the determination of a potentially taxable amount and the determination of whether and when to tax it is more complex than appears at first blush. It begins with the identification of an item as
within the aegis of the system (that is, as potentially taxable). 38 The
identification can be complicated by questions of whose potentially tax34. See, e-g., B. BITTK.ER & L. LOKKEN, supranote 22, at § 5.1; M. CHIRELSTEIN, supranote
5.01, at 68-69; M. GRAETz, supra note 3, at 110, 202.
35. See, eg., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, 5.01, at 68; H. SIMONS, supra note 15, at
207-08; Andrews, supra note 24, at 1140-48; Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation- Tax Expenditure
or ProperAllowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1979).
36. See, eg., B. BARTON, R. CAMPFIELD, et al, Taxation of Income 1988-1989, at 2511
(1988); D. PoslN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 146-48 (1983). Perhaps the
clearest current counterexample to this view can be found in I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (1988). These
provisions set forth the rules for taxing original interest discount, a form of unrealized income.
37. Even the federal income tax system occasionally taxes unrealized amounts. See, eg.,
supra note 36; I.R.C. § 1256 (1988) (relating to certain regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts, nonequity options, and dealer equity options).
38. It is important to notice that the status of being potentially taxable within the federal
income tax system is not equivalent to any of the categories identified by the Code. The broadest
category specified by the Code is I.R.C. § 61 (West Supp. 1990) gross income. However, some
amounts are statutorily excluded from gross income (eg., I.R.C. § 102 (1988) (amounts received
as gifts, bequests, inheritances, and devises); see supra note 24 for other examples) and their
exclusion would be unnecessary if they were not potentially taxable.
22,
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able amount it is 39 and questions about the point at which it became
potentially taxable (a different set of questions from questions about

whether or when it should be taxed). The initial identification of
something as potentially taxable very often does happen to coincide
with the identification of an amount that has been realized by the taxpayer. In simple terms, something often becomes potentially taxable

(although maybe not taxable income) in the eyes of the tax system at
the same time that the taxpayer realizes it in the eyes of the tax system. For example, in the federal income tax system, a cash basis tax-

payer's receipt of his paycheck marks both the receipt of a potentially
taxable amount and its realization. But its status as potentially taxable

is independent of the fact that it was realized. 40 It is clear, moreover,
that amounts identified as potentially taxable are not always realized
at the time of their identification. One obvious example in the federal

income tax system is the so-called unrealized appreciation of an asset.
Presently the federal system does not tax the appreciation of an asset

until the taxpayer disposes of it and realizes its increase in value.41
There seems to be widespread sentiment among tax commentators
however, that Congress could, if it chose to, tax appreciation cur-

rently. 42 This view reflects the sense that a potentially taxable amount
need not be realized to become taxable income.

Once something has been identified within the system as a potentially taxable amount, it becomes relevant to ask whether and when it
should be taxed; to ask, in other words, whether it should be recognized, have its recognition deferred, or be excluded altogether from

taxation (receive permanent nonrecognition treatment). These three
basic responses to a potentially taxable amount are the only ones available to any income tax system. It is easy to think of examples of each
39. The question of attribution in the context of ascertaining potential taxability is likely the
same as the question of attribution in the context of ascertaining actual taxability ("taxable income" in the federal system). This is because once an amount has been identified as potentially
taxable to X, the response of the system can be to tax it (to X) now, to tax it (to X) later, or to
exclude it from taxation (to X). If the last option is selected and the amount is instead taxed
(now or later) to Y then the amount can be construed as having been reidentified as potentially
taxable to . Indeed, the amount may be taxed to Y even if it is also being taxed to X (and
perhaps to others as well). This simply means that the same amount has been identified as potentially taxable to more than one taxpayer. In fact, because the federal system does not explicitly
isolate the question of potential taxability at all, it is difficult to tell in which context an attribu.
tion question is being asked.
40. Although here it is the receipt that constitutes the realization, receipt is not a necessary
condition of realization.
41. See, eg., Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: CurrentDevelopments and
Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REv. 225, 228 (1979).
42. See, eg., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, 1 5.01, at 68-9; M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at
201; Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 49 (1967); Shakow,
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986).
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in the context of the federal income tax. The paycheck received by the
cash basis taxpayer above probably will be recognized currently, 4 3 the
compensation put into an Individual Retirement Account by a taxpayer has its taxation deferred, 44 and the amount received by a taxpayer as a bequest is excluded from his income tax permanently. 45
Although a system that provides for the possibility of exclusion
can only tax (now or later) or not tax amounts that it deems within its
scope, it need not make the choice when it identifies those amounts as
potentially taxable. Of course, if the choice is deferred, taxation at the
time of identification is no longer an option and any subsequent decision to tax will have resulted in a deferral of the amount's recognition.
Our system does exactly this when refusing to recognize the unrealized
appreciation of an asset. Such appreciation is potentially taxable
within the system and is not taxed currently, but its ultimate treatment
is not settled until some later time (often the time the asset is disposed
of). If, for example, appreciated stock with a basis in the hands of the
taxpayer of $10 has a fair market value of $50 on March 3, the taxpayer has a potentially taxable $40 that the system could tax currently. Instead the system does nothing. This leaves open both the
possibility that the amount will be taxed later and the possibility that
it will be excluded altogether. If the price of the shares remains at $50
until April 2, when it drops to $45, and if the taxpayer sells the shares
on April 2 for $45, he will normally recognize $35. Thus, from the
perspective of the situation on March 3, he has deferred the recognition of $35 and excluded $5 altogether. If, instead, the taxpayer were
to die on April 2, holding the appreciated shares with a fair market
value of $45, current federal income tax law would exclude both the
$35 of potentially taxable, but untaxed, appreciation that the taxpayer
held at his death and the potentially taxable $5 that he had held on
March 3 but that he no longer held on April 2.
Other examples are less straightforward. Suppose the stock price
fluctuates between March 3 and April 2. If the price were $48 on
March 4, $47 on March 5, $52 on March 6, and $50 from March 7
until the stock was sold for $50, we cannot simply compare the sale
price with the price on March 3 and say that, from the perspective of
the situation on March 3, the taxation of the $40 identified on that
43. I.R.C. §§ 61(a) and 446 (1988).
44. A qualified individual may contribute up to a specified amount (currently $2000) to an
Individual Retirement Account and deduct that amount from her gross income. I.R.C. § 219
(West Supp. 1990). Any distributions from the I.R.A. will be included in the taxpayer's gross
income, so the deduction has the effect of deferring taxation on the contributed amount until a
distribution is made. See I.R.C. § 408 (1988).
45. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1988).
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date as potentially taxable had been deferred. Instead, it would seem
as if $2 of that amount had been lost on March 4 and another $1 of it
lost on March 5. Those lost amounts are permanently excluded from
taxation. Five additional dollars were earned on March 6, and two of
them were lost (and hence excluded) on March 7. Thus, from the
perspective of the $40 identified on March 3 as potentially taxable, the
sale of the stock for $50 should represent the (deferred) recognition of
$37 and the exclusion of $3. The remaining $3 recognized as taxable
income was identified as potentially taxable on March 6, along with $2
46
that was subsequently excluded.
This last example raises a question about the first one. What does
it mean to say "from the perspective of the situation on March 3"?
Unless the entire $40 of appreciation present on that date was first
identifiable on that date, it, no less than the appreciation measured on
April 2, represents a net figure established over the life of the investment. In the absence of special circumstances, the choice of March 3
as a time to measure the unrealized appreciation of the stock is arbitrary. At least some of the amount identified on that date as potentially taxable likely could have been identified earlier and traced
forward to March 3, just as it was traced beyond March 3 in my examples. The point of the examples is to show that the federal income tax
system sometimes defers the determination of whether and when to
tax a potentially taxable amount until some time after it has identified
the amount as potentially taxable. It is not necessary, for this purpose,
actually to specify when the identification could first have been made.
46. The federal income tax system allows some losses to be deducted from a taxpayer's gross
income. In contexts where losses are fully allowed, the potentially taxable amounts that are

permanently excluded from taxation because of downward fluctuations in the value of the asset
would not have been taxed even if they had been recognized. Thus, in the example in the text,
the $35 gain recognized from the sale of the shares on April 2 for $45 is the same amount that
would ultimately have been recognized if the shares had been sold and repurchased each time
that their value had changed and the attendant losses and gains had been recognized.

Date
March
March
March
March

Basis

Sale & Repurchase

Gain
or

Price

(Loss)

3
4
5
6

$10
$50
$48
$47

$50
$48
$47
$52

$40
(2)
(I)
5

March 7

$52

$50

(2)

April 2
Net gain = $35

$50

$45

(5)

The result would not be the same, however, in contexts where losses are not fully allowed. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 165(c) (1988) (limitation on losses deductible by an individual to those incurred in a
trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit or from casualty or theft); I.R.C.
§ 267 (1988) (disallowance of losses with respect to transactions between related taxpayers);
I.R.C. § 1091 (1988) (disallowance of losses from wash sales).
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It is sufficient that the amount has been identified and that its ultimate
treatment has not yet been decided.

If a decision is made not to recognize currently an amount identified by a tax system as potentially taxable, at least three general types
of nonrecognition are possible. One is to exclude the amount from
taxation. 47 Within the federal income tax system this result is

achieved both by provisions cast explicitly as exclusions 48 and by provisions cast as deductions.4 9 It is also achieved preliminarily by the
realization requirement itself. Since the system normally conditions

taxation on realization, much that is potentially taxable is excluded
because it is lost before it is realized. This effect is illustrated by the

downward fluctuations in the unrealized appreciation of the stock in
the earlier examples.5 0
A second possible kind of nonrecognition is deferral. A decision
not to recognize currently a potentially taxable amount could be a de-

cision to defer its recognition until some future date or event. This
means, of course, that the amount would be recognized, but later.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that in a pure deferral, the amount

of the later recognition would be at least the amount identified as potentially taxable at the time of the decision to defer its recognition. To

the extent that the later recognition were contingent upon the occur-

rence of a subsequent event 51 or upon the taxpayer's surviving until

some later date,52 "pure deferral" would be something of a misnomer,
but it is one with which I propose to live for the moment. I am not
47. This response is possible, of course, only in a system that is sufficiently complex to include exclusion as a potential reaction.
48. See supra note 24 for examples.
49. See, eg., I.R.C. § 163 (1988) (deduction for certain interest payments); I.R.C. § 164
(1988) (deduction for certain taxes).
50. See Grauer, The Supreme Court'sApproach to Annual and TransactionalAccounting for
Income Taxes" A Common Law Malfunction in a StatutorySystem?, 21 GA. L. REv. 329, 393-97
(1986) (characterizing the realization requirement as an example of transactional accounting).
51. For example, I.R.C. § 1034 (1988) provides that a taxpayer will recognize current gain
on the sale of his principal residence only to the extent, if any, that the adjusted sales price
exceeds the cost of a newly purchased principal residence. The taxpayer's basis in his new residence is reduced by any nonrecognized gain. This basis adjustment serves to defer recognition of
the earlier gain until the new residence is sold. The recognition is still contingent, however, on
the new residence's being sold for more than its adjusted basis, on the taxpayer's not buying yet
another principal residence for more than the sale price of the second one (thus falling once again
within the nonrecognition provided by § 1034), and on the taxpayer's not qualifying and electing
under I.R.C. § 121 (1988) (a one-time exclusion of up to $125,000 of gain on the sale of a principal residence by a taxpayer age 55 or older) to exclude all or part of the previously deferred gain.
52. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1988) provides that a person who inherits property takes it with a basis
equal to its fair market value at the date of the decedent's death. Because no Code provision
requires that either the decedent or his estate recognize any difference between the decedent's
actual basis in the property and its fair market value, any previously deferred gain which was
reflected in the decedent's basis (under § 1034 for example) will be permanently forgiven.
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certain in fact that there are any examples of genuinely pure deferral
53
within the federal income tax system.
A third general sort of nonrecognition is the result of a decision to
ignore an event that ordinarily would trigger recognition. A decision
to ignore in this context is obviously similar to the choice, discussed
above,54 to defer the decision about whether or when to tax something
identified as potentially taxable.
In our current tax system, this phenomenon is illustrated by provisions tying nonrecognition to a carryover basis. There are many such
provisions, 55 but a single example should illustrate the point. If taxpayer A buys a building for $20,000 and its value appreciates to
$100,000, we call her gain unrealized as long as A continues simply to
hold the building. If the building is destroyed by fire and A receives
insurance proceeds of $100,000, she has realized $80,000 gain. The
federal tax system generally regards the realization of gain as an occasion for the recognition of income. Section 1033 of the Internal Revenue Code allows A to avoid recognition of that gain if she reinvests it
within a specified time5 6 in "similar" property.57 If the cost of the
similar property is $100,000, the replacement property will have the
same basis as the original property.58 Here the Code appears to indulge in a bit of metaphysical fiction and treats the replacement property as if it were the original, undiminished by fire. If that is indeed
what is happening, then section 1033 is properly characterized as a
provision that ignores the realization that the receipt of the insurance
proceeds represented. That moment of realization, under this analysis, cannot be regarded as an occasion for deferral or forgiveness of the
53. I.R.C. § 1363(d) (1988) may come close to being an example of pure deferral. That

section requires a corporation that converts from C status to S status to recapture the amount of
any excess of its inventory valued as of the end of its last tax year as a C corporation using a firstin-first-out cost flow assumption, over its last-in-first-out value. The tax is paid in four equal

installments and its amount is independent of any subsequent value of the inventory. The first
installment is due on the due date for the S corporation's last return as a C corporation and the
remaining three are due on the due dates of the S corporation's return for the three succeeding

years. If the S corporation fails to survive for three years, liability for the uncollected amount
would presumably pass through to its shareholders under I.R.C. § 1366 (1988).

54. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
55. See, eg., I.R.C. § 351 (1988) (exchange of property for stock or securities in corporation

controlled by transferor); I.R.C. § 354 (1988) (exchange of stock or securities in a corporate
reorganization); I.R.C. § 721 (1988) (exchange of property for partnership interest); I.R.C.
§ 1015 (1988) (gifts); I.R.C. § 1031 (1988) (like-kind exchanges of business or investment property); I.R.C. § 1033 (1988) (involuntary conversions of property); I.R.C. § 1035 (1988) (certain
exchanges of life insurance and annuity contracts); I.R.C. § 1036 (1988) (certain exchanges of

stock for stock in same corporation); I.R.C. § 1041 (1988) (transfers of property between spouses
or incident to divorce).
56. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B) (1988).

57. I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1988).
58. I.R.C. § 1033(b) (1988).
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amount realized. Taxation of the realized gain is not being deferred
because the amount of gain taxed upon the final disposition of the second property is a function solely of the difference between the amount
received for the second property and its basis and is in no way affected
by the amount of the earlier realization. The gain is not being forgiven
or permanently excluded because if the value of the replacement property persists, the appreciation of the original property will be recognized when the replacement property is disposed of.5 9 The provisions
that are commonly referred to as deferral provisions in the federal income tax system are in fact nonrecognition provisions of this sort.60
B.

The Role of Reconciliation

Because a tax system of any complexity will provide for various
possible treatments of potentially taxable amounts, it makes sense to
ask whether the choices that the system makes are irrevocable. For
example, if a system included only the possibilities of immediate recognition (current taxation) and permanent exclusion from taxation,
could it later include the previously excluded amount or exclude the
item taxed earlier? The same question arises with respect to the characterization of items. The federal income tax system provides for differing tax results depending on the characterization of potentially
taxable amounts as, for example, capital gain, passive income, or ordinary income. Clearly nothing inherent in the structure of an income
tax system requires either that its particular choices, once made, be
permanent or that they be susceptible to change.
A system that opted for revocable choices could incorporate any of
a number of features to facilitate flexibility. For example, it could pro6 1 it
vide for reconsideration of earlier choices at pre-set intervals,
could institute some form of open-ended transactional accounting as a
means of aggregating amounts identified as potentially taxable, or it
could incorporate an amendatory mechanism for correcting earlier responses that later seemed inappropriate. The most likely motivation
59. Of course, if the value of the property fluctuates, as in the earlier stock example, see supra
note 46 and accompanying text, the amount of the realized gain that is lost will thereby have
been forgiven.
60. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 721-723 (1988) (exchange of appreciated property for partnership
interest); I.R.C. § 1031 (1988) (like-kind exchanges of appreciated property); I.R.C. § 1034
(1988) (sale of appreciated principal residence combined with purchase of new one); I.R.C.
§ 1035 (1988) (certain exchanges of life insurance and annuity contracts); I.R.C. § 1036 (1988)
(certain exchanges of stock for stock in the same corporation); I.R.C. § 1037 (1988) (certain
exchanges of U.S. obligations); I.R.C. § 1041 (1988) (transfers of appreciated property between
spouses or incident to divorce).
61. It probably could not allow for criterion-less reconsideration at will and still remain a

system.
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for making the responses of a system revocable would seem to be the
desire to prevent mistakes within the system from becoming permanent. It is important to note, however, that any such device is a mechanism whereby a system can determine whether and when to tax that
which it deems potentially taxable and, to that extent at least, plays a
role not unlike that played by realization in the federal income tax
system.
Two general sorts of corrective devices are available to any tax
system. The simplest way to correct a mistake is simply to undo it.
Life seldom affords us that opportunity, but a tax system might come
close. If, for example, a taxpayer within an income tax system includes in taxable income something that the system, its rules correctly
applied, treats as excludable, the system could allow him to go back
and recalculate his taxable income after he discovers his mistake. It
could allow him to make whatever future adjustments are necessary to
put him in precisely the position he would have been in had he initially
made an accurate calculation. The federal income tax system provides
for something like this kind of "return amendment" within three years
62
of the filing date of the original tax return.
On the other hand, some kinds of mistakes cannot be undone.
Sometimes we make decisions that turn out to be mistaken because
things did not turn out as we reasonably had expected them to. I decide to drive to work and not to walk because I am in a hurry. I arrive
at my office much later than I would have had I walked, because I was
involved in an automobile accident on the way. Or I decide to go to
Kauai for my vacation, and it is unexpectedly devastated by a typhoon
while I am there. In cases like these, it would not be enough to be
given the opportunity to return to the original point of decision. The
decisions themselves were entirely reasonable when they were made.
Only unforeseeable subsequent events cause these choices to be
mistakes.
Analogous errors can be made in the context of a tax system. Assume, for example, an income tax system that allows the exclusion
(through a deduction) of all potentially taxable amounts spent on food
consumed by the taxpayer. Assume, too, that the system requires taxpayers to calculate and report their taxable income on a monthly basis
and that it requires them to deduct money spent on food in the period
62. I.R.C. § 651 l(a) (1988) allows a taxpayer to file an amended return which claims either a
credit or a refund within the later of three years from the time the original return was filed or two
years from the time the tax was paid. The amount of any credit or refund is limited to the tax
paid within the applicable period plus interest. I.R.C. § 651 1(b)(2) (1988); I.R.C. § 6611(a)

(1988).
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in which it is spent, even if the food will be consumed later. If a taxpayer in this system spent $100 in May on meat that she planned to
eat in June but did not eat because she discovered in June that the
meat was tainted, two mistakes would have occurred. First, it was
obviously a mistake for the taxpayer to have spent $100 on tainted
meat, but second, her deduction of the $100 in May has turned out to
have been a mistake too. If the taxpayer could have known when she
bought the meat that it was spoiled or that it would spoil before she
would eat it, then she likely would not have taken the May deduc-

tion. 63 This mistake, at least, would be amenable to the kind of corrective measure provided by return amendment. If, however, the
taxpayer could not have known in May about the taint (perhaps because it came about as a result of a power outage in June), then her

second mistake is analogous to my mistaken decisions to drive to work
and to vacation on Kauai. Return amendment would not be an appro-

priate antidote because the mistake did not lie in the return. The return only became an inaccurate account of the taxpayer's income
because of what happened in June.64 But the May return did nonethe-

less present an incorrect picture of what happened in May since the
taxpayer did not in fact spend $100 for meat that she eventually

consumed.
Mistakes of this sort are possible in any tax system that both is
capable of giving more than one possible response to amounts identified as potentially taxable and requires periodic accounting. 65 A system could simply accept such mistakes as a cost of the enormous
63. Assume that no deduction is allowed in this system for the tainted meat.
I cannot forbear noting here, in anticipation of the discussion (see infra text accompanying
notes 77-97) of the tax benefit rule, that there is a curious difference between the scienter requirement of provisions, like the hypothetical one in the example and, more importantly, like I.R.C.
§ 162 (West Supp. 1990) (business expense deduction), which condition deductibility on the intended and predicted use of the purchased item, and provisions, like I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1990) which provides for the deductibility of state income taxes paid, which condition
deductibility simply on whether the expense was in fact incurred or accrued (as the case may be)
regardless of the taxpayer's knowledge that he will later receive a refund of the expenditure.
64. See, e-g., Stradlings Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 84 (1981), for a good
example of exactly this sort of inaccuracy. In Stradlingsthe taxpayer deducted prepaid intangible drilling expenses pursuant to a binding contract with a company called Thor. In a subsequent year Thor breached the contract by not drilling. The Tax Court upheld the original
deduction:
The determination and payment of income taxes is based on annual accounting periods.
This determination is based on the facts as they exist with respect to the particular year
involved ....
We do not see how respondent [the IRS] could have expected petitioner to
foresee that Thor would breach his contractual commitment subsequent to June 30, 1973,
the end of petitioner's 1973 fiscal year.
76 T.C. at 89-90.
65. Such mistakes might also arise where there has been transactional accounting if a transaction that was apparently closed (and had therefore been accounted for within the tax system)
later reopened.
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administrative benefits that come from periodic accounting. Consistent with this position, it would include no corrective devices designed
to address this kind of mistake. The taxpayer who bought the meat in
May would be allowed her deduction, and the fact that it spoiled in
June would have no tax consequences for her. But a system might
utilize a second general sort of corrective device. It is to that device
that I now turn.
If a mistake cannot be undone effectively (either because of the
nature of the mistake or because the system does not include a corrective mechanism of the first sort), it might still be mitigated by making
an adjustment to the current period's accounting.6 6 Consider, once
again, the example of the tainted meat. The income tax system could
respond to the fact that the meat is disposed of in June without being
consumed by the taxpayer by adding some amount to June's reported
income. I say "some amount" because the determination of the measure of the corrective adjustment in a case like the example raises a set
of issues of its own. Put these aside briefly and focus instead on the
nature of the adjustment. It is an adjustment that seeks to reconcile
the present 67 with the past to make them compatible. Clearly such
adjustments have considerably greater feasibility within the quantifiable context of a tax system than they do within most of the nonquantifable contexts in which mistakes occur. But, to return to my hurried
drive to work and my vacation in Kauai, it is as if I could see these
calamities through somewhat rose-colored glasses - it was not bad,
after all (and unpredictably), that I did not arrive at the office when I
would have, had all gone as expected, and I am not unhappy that I got
to experience a typhoon at close range on my vacation.
The second general sort of corrective device available to a tax system, then, is reconciliation.6 8 The federal income tax system makes
enormous use of this mechanism, 6 9 both by itself and in combination
with return amendment. Although the applications of reconciliation
66. There are three other logical possibilities. The adjustment could be made to a future
period's accounting, made to some other past period's accounting, or allocated in some way
between the accounting of multiple periods. Nothing said in this article about adjusting the
current period's accounting is inconsistent with the possibility of adjusting a past or future period's accounting instead or as well. None of these other sorts of adjustment would be as conceptually satisfying and none is much relied on by the federal income tax system. But see I.R.C.
§ 6511(d)(2) (1988) (establishing a period of limitation and procedures for adjusting for overpayments attributable to net operating loss carrybacks or capital loss carrybacks).
67. Or the future, if the adjustment were to a future accounting period.
68. See White, supra note 9.
69. Though not in StradlingsBldg. Materials,Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 84 (1981), discussed supra note 64, because the only year at issue was the year in which the deduction had been
taken.
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are familiar, they are seldom all viewed as instances of the same phenomenon. Nor is there any sense of the role of that phenomenon in
the overall structure of the system.
II.

THE DESCRIPTIVE POWER OF RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation itself is not, of course, a necessary feature of a tax
system. A system might not provide for the sort of correction afforded
by reconciliation. But a system might in fact allow for the possibility
of nonamendatory revocability, and, if the foregoing account is correct, any such change will be an instance of reconciliation whether or
not it is so described. Thus, I do not argue that each of the following
examples of the operation of reconciliation within the federal income
tax system is widely perceived as such. 70 None of them is. Indeed, as
far as I know, "reconciliation" in this context is my own term.7 1 Instead, I am interested in exposing the structural framework that must
underlie any tax system and hence any income tax system. Once the
necessary features of the structure are understood, we can begin to
give a much richer description of the details of our particular system.
A.

The Claim of Right Doctrine

Perhaps the easiest context within the federal income system in
which to see reconciliation operating as a corrective device is the socalled claim of right doctrine. Sometimes a taxpayer, in good faith,
includes an amount in the taxable income of one year only to discover
in a later year that the amount did not properly belong to him and
must be returned. Sometimes a taxpayer claims in one year that he is
entitled to an amount even though his claim is being disputed and in a
later year may be resolved against him. Broadly stated, the claim of
right doctrine requires a taxpayer to include in his or its taxable income any amount otherwise currently taxable and acquired or held
under a claim of entitlement. 72 Thus, in both circumstances, the tax70. Nor do I claim that any of these examples currently represents a fully consistent application of reconciliation. Still less do I wish to argue that good tax policy necessarily requires a
consistent application of this (or any other) principle.
71. White, supra note 9, at 496. The term seems now to have been adopted in the context of
the tax benefit rule by Chirelstein as well. M. CHIRELSTaIN, supra note 22, 110.03, at 217.
72. The claim of right doctrine has its genesis in North American Oil Consolidatedv. Burnet,
286 U.S. 417 (1932). A dispute arose between North American and the U.S. government concerning profits earned in 1916 from certain government-owned oil properties, from which the
government was seeking to oust the company. The disputed profits were placed in the hands of a
receiver appointed to operate the property and hold the income until the dispute was resolved.
In 1917, the government's case was dismissed, and the receiver paid the money to North American. Meanwhile, the government pursued appeals without success until 1922. North American
reported the income for the tax year 1916 through an amended return filed in 1918. The Coin-
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payer correctly includes the amount in the earlier year's taxable income but, as a result, may fail to meet the system's standards of

accuracy for measurement of that year's taxable income. The tax system could, of course, make no effort to respond to the inaccuracy. Or
it could require the taxpayer to amend its original return in the light of
later events. In this context, the federal income tax system has developed a different response - it adjusts the current (later) year's taxable

income. 73 The current situation, Le., the one in which the earlier included amount has been relinquished, is reconciled with the earlier
one.
The notion of transcending strict adherence to annual accounting

to reconcile the present with the past does not necessarily require that
the reconciliation be complete. Thus, the amount of the corrective
missioner assessed a deficiency for North American's failure to report the income for 1917, the
year the company actually received the income, rather than for 1916.
The Court held that the disputed profits became income to the company in 1917, when it first
became entitled to them and when it actually received them, regardless of whether the company's
return was filed on a cash or accrual basis.
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its
disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still
be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be
adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.
286 U.S. at 424.
The Court rejected North American's claim that the income was reportable in 1916, either by
North American or by the receiver, who held the profits. The income was not taxable to the
receiver because he was the receiver of only a part of the properties operated by the company
and, therefore, was not required to file a return. The amount was not income to North American
in 1916, because the company was not required to report as income an amount that it might
never receive. Consistently with the position it had taken, the Court similarly rejected North
American's alternative claim that the income was reportable in 1922 when the Government's last
appeal failed and the dispute was finally resolved. The Court, however, did say, in dicta, that if
the Government had prevailed in the final appeal, North American would have been entitled to a
deduction from its 1922 income, since it would have paid the money to the Government in that
year. This approach was subsequently adopted by the federal income tax system. See infra note
73.
The claim of right doctrine has been applied to require inclusion in income during the tax
year in which the payment was received even if the payments were based on erroneous computations or were obtained illegally. The fact that the taxpayer might have to relinquish the money to
a superior claimant in later years does not affect the income's taxability in a tax year when the
taxpayer has unrestricted use of the income. See, eg., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213
(1961) (embezzled monies income to embezzler regardless of duty to repay); United States v.
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (compensation based on erroneously computed employer's profits
includable in income under claim of right rule although later repayment of erroneous amount
required). See generally B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 22, at 6.3; Lister, The Use and
Abuse of Pragmatism: The JudicialDoctrine of Claim of Right, 21 TAX L. REv. 263 (1966).
73. This approach consists of two components, one of judicial origin and the other statutory.
The judicially created aspect provides for deduction from gross income in the tax year in which
repayment is made, rather than for amendment of the prior year's tax return. This result was
suggested in dicta in North American, 286 U.S. at 424. See supra note 72. However, United
States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951), is the case in which the Supreme Court first actually applied
this approach.
The statutory component of this approach is embodied in I.R.C. § 1341 (1988). That section
provides for the special computation of the tax due from a taxpayer who is deducting the restoration of an amount previously included in income under a claim of right.
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adjustment is not dictated by the fact of the use of reconciliation. Two
methods of measuring that amount have figured in the development of
the claim of right doctrine. In United States v. Lewis,74 the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer who had received a cash bonus in 1944,
reported the amount as income on his 1944 return, was later notified
that the bonus was greater than it should have been, and repaid half of

the amount in 1946, could not reopen his 1944 return to reflect what
had happened in 1946 but must instead be content to deduct the repayment amount in 1946. The taxpayer in Lewis had a higher effective

tax rate in 1944 than he had in 1946, and so the deduction in 1946 did
not fully correct for the tax overpayment of 1944. If his tax rate for

1946 had been higher than his rate for 1944, he would have been better
off taking the deduction in 1946 than amending his 1944 return, but
reconciliation would still have been an imperfect corrective device be-

cause it would have overcorrected for the earlier inclusion.
In 1954, Congress reacted to the Lewis side of this imbalance with

section 1341 of the Code.75 That provision allows a taxpayer in Lewis'
situation to choose, instead of taking a deduction in the year of repay-

ment, to lower his tax bill for the repayment year by an amount equal
to the tax that would have been saved in the earlier year had the
amount later repaid not been included in the first place. 76 Although
74. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
75. It seems clear that I.R.C. § 1341 (1988) was enacted solely to cure the unfair situation
present in Lewis The House Report on § 1341 contains the following reference to the case:
If the taxpayer included an item in gross income in one taxable year, and in a subsequent
taxable year he becomes entitled to a deduction because the item or a portion thereof is no
longer subject to his unrestricted use, and the amount of the deduction is in excess of $3,000,
the tax for the subsequent year is reduced by either the tax attributable to the deduction or
the decrease in the tax for the prior year attributable to the removal of the item, whichever is
greater. Under the rule of the Lewis case, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction only in the
year of repayment.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A294, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4017, 4436 (citation omitted); see also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 451, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621, 5095; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2543, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5280, 5333.
76. The provisions of I.R.C. § 1341 (1988) are applicable to a cash basis taxpayer in the tax
year "in which the item of income included in a prior year under a claim of right is actually
repaid" or in the year or years that the taxpayer relinquished his right to receive the income if the
income was only constructively received in the prior year. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(e) (as amended
in 1978). For an accrual method taxpayer, § 1341 applies "to the year in which the obligation
properly accrue[d] for the repayment of the item included under a claim of right." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1341-1(e) (as amended 1978).
"Income included under a claim of right" means an item included in gross income because it
appeared from the facts available in the year that the amount was included in gross income, that
the taxpayer had an "unrestricted right" to the income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a) (as amended
in 1978). The deductible amount is considered "restored" for § 1341 purposes if its repayment
results because it is established after the close of the prior tax year that the taxpayer did not have
an unrestricted right to the income, as he had earlier believed. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a) (as
amended in 1978).
There are certain limitations and exceptions to § 1341. For example, the section applies only
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this provision clearly protects taxpayers from suffering poor Lewis'
fate, it does not provide a perfect corrective either. Under section
1341, a taxpayer will not recover the costs to him (if any) associated

with having actually paid the tax in the earlier year. Nor does section
1341 prevent the overcorrection that occurs when the effective tax rate
in the year of deduction is higher than that for the earlier year of

inclusion.
B.

The Tax Benefit Rule

A tax system might also include some mechanism by which to correct the mistakes that result from deductions or exclusions that were

properly taken in one year but turn out in a later year, usually (but not
necessarily) because of the recovery of some (or all) of the amount
deducted or excluded, not to reflect what the system deems to be the
taxpayer's appropriately taxable amount. Here too, the federal income

tax system reconciles the later and earlier situations. The general
name given to our system's response to this kind of circumstance is the
"tax benefit rule." Roughly speaking, the tax benefit rule applies to
include the reclaimed amount in the later year's taxable income to the
extent that the earlier deduction or exclusion resulted in an actual tax

benefit. 77 Despite its obvious mirror-image-like relationship to what

today passes as the claim of right doctrine, the tax benefit rule

originated quite independently of its "converse." It has been an acknowledged feature of the federal income tax system since 1927, when

the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commissioner's claim that a
taxpayer who collected on accounts that had been listed on an earlier
year's return as deductible worthless accounts, had to include the
amount of the collections in income for the year of collection. 78 As
if the amount of income repayable (because the taxpayer does not have an unrestricted right to it)
exceeds $3000. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(3) (1988). Section 1341 does not generally apply to repayments
of amounts initially included in gross income by reason of the sale or other disposition of inventory by the taxpayer, such as sales returns and allowances. I.R.C. § 1341(b)(2) (1988); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1341-1(f)(1) (as amended in 1978). In addition, the regulations provide that § 1341
does not apply to deductions attributable to bad debts or legal fees and expenses incurred by the
taxpayer in contesting the restoration of an item previously included in income. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1341-1(g), (h) (as amended in 1978). Further, § 1341(b)(4) and (5) provide special rules regarding the treatment of net operating losses and capital losses.
77. For an extended discussion of the tax benefit rule, see White, supra note 9; see also M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at t 10.03.
The tax benefit rule has two aspects. The "inclusionary" component requires the inclusion in
income of an amount equal to the amount deducted in an earlier year. The "exclusionary" component conditions inclusion on there having been a tax benefit as the result of the earlier deduction. The exclusionary aspect is currently set forth in I.R.C. § 111 (1988).
78. Lee v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 541 (1927), affd. sub nom Carr v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d
551 (5th Cir. 1928); see also Excelsior Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 886 (1929) (recovery of debt earlier charged offas worthless held to be taxable income for year of recovery). In
these early cases the principle was limited to its inclusionary aspect and was not typically given a
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with any essentially nonstatutory rule, the contours of the tax benefit
principle within the federal income tax system have evolved over time.
Most recently, the Supreme Court, in HillsboroNationalBank v. Commissioner,79 dealt squarely, and at some length, with the tax benefit
rule. 80
The conventional description of what is happening when the tax
benefit rule is applied to require inclusion of the amount of an earlier
deduction in a taxpayer's income for a later year 8 ' is straightforward.
It is couched in terms of basis and realization. The item whose cost

was deducted8 2 has a basis in the taxpayer's hands equal to its after-tax
name. The exclusionary component first surfaced in 1932 when it was rejected by the Board of
Tax Appeals. Lake View Trust & Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 290 (1932). Congress
codified the exclusionary aspect in 1942. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 81213 (1942) (current version at I.R.C. § 111 (1988)). The phrase "tax benefit rule" was used by the
Board of Tax Appeals by 1942 primarily, if not exclusively, to refer to the rule's exclusionary
component. See Haughey v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 1, 4 (1942). Legal commentators from
the same period varied in their use of the phrase. See, eg., Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and
Related Problems, 20 TAXES 473, 473 (1942) (applies "tax benefit rule" to both components);
Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REv. 129, 130-31 (1943) (refers to inclusionary aspect as a "general rule" without naming it). Current use of the phrase encompasses both
the inclusionary and exclusionary components.
For further background on the history of the tax benefit rule, see generally Bittker & Kanner,
The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265 (1978); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of
Right Restorations,and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies,21 VAND. L. REv.
995, 999-1010 (1968).
79. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
80. Hillsboro was a consolidation of two cases presenting rather different fact situations. In
Hillsboro, Hillsboro National Bank paid a state property tax on behalf of its shareholders in
1972. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373. Because the validity of the tax was under question, the state
placed the collected amounts in escrow. Hillsbdro, 460 U.S. at 373. When the tax ultimately was
declared invalid, the state paid the amounts collected from the bank directly to the shareholders
on whom the tax had been imposed. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374. The Bank deducted its payment
of the tax under § 164(e), which allowed a corporate deduction for shareholder taxes paid by a
corporation, and it neither made any adjustment nor reported any income when the tax refund
was made to the shareholders by the state. Iillsboro, 460 U.S. at 373-74. The Commissioner
sought to use the tax benefit rule to include the amount of the refund in the bank's income.
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374. The bank argued that since it had not recovered the amount, the tax
benefit rule did not apply. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381.
The second case was originally known as United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. See infra text
accompanying notes 87-91 for a summary of the facts.
The Court rejected the view that economic recovery is required before the tax benefit rule can
apply. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381-83. It went on to hold that when a later event is "fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was initially based," the tax benefit
rule applies. 460 U.S. at 383. As articulated by the Court, the test is whether the later event
would have foreclosed the deduction if the two had occurred within the same taxable year. 460
U.S. at 383-84. Curiously, despite its articulation of the tax benefit rule, the Court did not frame
its consideration of whether the tax benefit rule actually applied to Hillsboro National Bank or
Bliss Dairy, Inc. in terms of fundamental inconsistency. It held that the rule did not apply to the
bank because of the legislative history of § 164(e) and that it did apply to the Dairy. See White,
supra note 9, at 499-500.
81. One example would be the inclusion of a taxpayer's state income tax refund in her federal
taxable income for the year received if she deducted it from her federal taxable income when she
paid the state tax in an earlier year.
82. The "item" in the example in note 81 supra is the state income tax paid.
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cost - zero if the entire cost was deducted. Thus, when the item is
recovered by the taxpayer, the amount realized is offset against its basis in the taxpayer's hands and the difference is treated as a realized
83
gain.
The conventional account, while adequate for many descriptive
purposes, does not capture a significant subset of the circumstances in
which the tax benefit rule has been applied. Nor, more importantly,
does it explain the role that the tax benefit rule has within the structure of the federal income tax system. A couple of examples can illustrate the first problem. The second will itself require a bit of
explanation.
The statutory portion of the tax benefit rule is set forth as section
111 of the Internal Revenue Code. That provision currently excludes
from income any recovered amounts that did not produce a tax benefit
when they were deducted in an earlier year.84 It represents the statutory expression of what has long been known as the exclusionary aspect of the nonstatutorily developed tax benefit rule.8 5 The adjusted
basis of any item that was expensed in the earlier year will be zero,
however, even if the deduction did not in fact yield a tax benefit. The
limitation on the inclusion of the recovered amount to the actual
amount of the earlier tax benefit is not simply the result of offsetting
the amount of the recovery against the basis.
Another, quite different, sort of example of the failure of what I
have called the "conventional account" to describe some core applications of the tax benefit rule is the Supreme Court's opinion in Hillsboro.8 6 Hillsboro was the name under which two cases were
consolidated. My point is best illustrated by the facts of the case originally known as United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.8 7 Bliss Dairy, Inc.
bought cattle feed for use in its business operations and deducted the
full cost of the feed in the same year. 8 Two days into the next taxable
year, the company liquidated under section 336.89 The assets distrib83. See, eg., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at

10.03.

84. I.R.C. § 111(a) (1988) currently provides: "Gross income does not include income attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of any amount deducted in any prior taxable

year to the extent such amount did not reduce the amount of tax imposed by this chapter."
85. See supra note 77.

86. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
87. See supra note 80 for a description of the facts of the case originally known as Hillsboro
Natl Bank v. Commissioner.
88. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374.
89. Hilsboro,460 U.S. at 374. At the time that Bliss liquidated, I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982) pro-

vided in pertinent part that "no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribu-

tion of property in complete liquidation." That section was substantially changed by the Tax

Reform Act of 1986 to make nonrecognition the exception rather than the rule.
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uted to its shareholders by Bliss in liquidation included unused,
though previously expensed, cattle feed. 90 Bliss did not include the
value of the unused cattle feed in its income for the second year on the
ground that the tax benefit rule required an actual recovery of a previous tax benefit. 9 1 The Supreme Court applied the tax benefit rule to
Bliss Dairy saying, "[t]he purpose of the rule is not simply to tax 'recoveries.' "92 Instead, the rule "ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income when events occur that are fundamentally inconsistent
with an earlier deduction. ' 93 The Court has been much criticized for
its failure fully to spell out when a later event is "fundamentally inconsistent" with an earlier deduction. 94 Instead, the Court left both the
content of the notion and the conditions of its application somewhat
vague. The emphasis throughout the opinion however is on the relationship between the later year's circumstances and the prior year's
report of taxable income. The Court makes no explicit effort to specify
precisely the conditions that trigger the comparison, much less to tie
the rule's application to the current realization of some amount. Thus,
although the amount included in taxable income under the tax benefit
rule may well equal the difference between a current valuation and a
previously established basis, 95 it is at least unhelpful to describe the
rule solely in terms of an amount realized against which the adjusted
basis is offset.
As a general matter, a tax system could build the possibility of
understatement into its operating rules by allowing taxpayers to deduct or exclude amounts on the assumption (tacit or explicit) that certain future events would or would not occur. So long as the future is
contingent, such a system includes the possibility that the taxpayer has
understated his taxable income - at least that she would have stated
it differently had she known then what she knows now. She has made
a mistake akin to the ones I made when I took my vacation trip to
Kauai or drove to my office. A system with this feature might or
might not include a mechanism or mechanisms to correct the mistakes
90. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374.

91. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381; Brief for the Respondent Bliss Dairy, Inc. at 5, Hillsboro (No.
81-930).
92. 460 U.S. at 381.
93. 460 U.S. at 372.
94. See, eg., 460 U.S. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in Hillsboro and dissenting in Bliss);
Blum, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Tax Controversies- Hillsboro National Bank
and Bliss Dairy, Inc., 61 TAxES 363, 366-67 (1983); White, supra note 9, at 495-99; Comment,

An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit Rule, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1257, 1270-78 (1984).
95. But see the example discussed supra text accompanying note 86.
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it will inevitably breed. The federal income tax system does. The tax
benefit rule is an example of one such mechanism.
The principal role of the tax benefit rule within the federal income
tax system is corrective. It serves as an exception to the administrative
requirement of annual accounting when annual accounting distorts a
taxpayer's taxable income in a manner favorable to the taxpayer. Obviously, it does not apply in all instances where a taxpayer's income
for some year has been understated, 96 but it only applies in instances
where that has happened. Moreover, as Hillsboro tells us, the tax benefit rule only applies when the understatement occurs because a later
year's events are "fundamentally inconsistent" with the picture of the
future upon which the original deduction (or deductions) was premised. The rule applies to reconcile the past prediction of the future
with the actual outcome. This is the principal function of the tax benefit rule, and it is this central feature that the "conventional" description of the rule fails to capture.
Finally, it should be noted that the notion of an understatement or
distortion of a taxpayer's taxable income is a relative one. In this discussion, I am giving a schematic account of the structure of any tax
system, and I began with a set of observations that emphasized the
independence of the determination of what constitutes a potentially
taxable amount within a system from the determination of whether
and when to tax it. Although, for example, a system could certainly
seek to employ a notion of potentially taxable amount identical to the
economists' sense of income (whatever that sense is) and could further
attempt to structure its taxing mechanisms so as to tax all amounts
thus construed as soon as they became the taxpayer's, there is no necessary identity between a taxpayer's taxable income for any year and
his income in the economist's sense for the same year. 97 Further, since
a system could adopt any notion of potentially taxable amount and
any standards for determining whether and when to tax it, an understatement of taxable income can only result within a system's own
framework.
C. Recapture Provisions
My third example of reconciliation operating within the federal income tax system is, in a way, a variant of the tax benefit rule. The
Internal Revenue Code includes a number of recapture provisions
96. In some circumstances return amendment is the appropriate antidote, in others the stat-

ute of limitations (normally three years after a tax return is filed; see I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1988))
operates to allow a taxpayer to ignore the earlier understatement.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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whereby an amount is included in a later year as an adjustment for a

deduction or credit taken in an earlier year. 98 Section 1245 historically has been the most important 99 of these provisions, and, although
its current importance has been much reduced by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986,100 it illustrates reconciliation well. Another reason for using
section 1245 as illustrative of recapture provisions generally is that its
intimate connection with depreciation invites a look at depreciation,

which itself illuminates the nature of reconciliation.
When an asset is depreciated for tax purposes, a deduction is taken
from the taxpayer's taxable income and the taxpayer's basis in the asset is adjusted downward by the amount of the deduction.10 1 If, as
usually happens, the fair market value of the asset has not in fact decreased by an amount as large as the depreciation deduction, a subsequent sale of the asset will result in gain to the taxpayer even if the fair

market value of the asset has not increased during the period that the
taxpayer has held it. Section 1231 of the Code provides for long-term
capital gain treatment for net gain from the sale of depreciable assets.
Until it was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, section 1202
98. See, eg., I.R.C. § 1245 (1988) (recapture as ordinary income of gains from certain depreciable property); I.R.C. § 1250 (1988) (recapture as ordinary income of gains from certain depreciable realty); I.R.C. § 1252 (1988) (recapture as ordinary income of certain amounts deducted
under I.R.C. § 175 (1988) (soil and water expenditures) and I.R.C. § 182 (1988) (land clearing
expenditures)); I.R.C. § 280F(b)(3) (1988) (recapture of excess depreciation of listed property
not in fact predominantly used in a qualified business use); I.LC. § 1254 (1988) (recapture as
ordinary income of gains from disposition of certain oil, gas, or geothermal property).
99. At least as measured by frequency of application. The disposition of any tangible depreciable property connected with manufacturing, transportation, or any other business enterprise
historically has been likely to trigger § 1245.
100. Section 1245 and other recapture provisions that transform capital gain into ordinary
income have, temporarily at least, lost much of their importance because of the elimination of the
capital gains preference. The statutory structure for distinguishing between ordinary income and
capital gains remains intact, but both are currently subject to the same tax rates. ("The current
statutory structure for capital gains is retained in the Code to facilitate reinstatement of a capital
gains rate differential if there is a future tax rate increase." H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d
sess. IH-106, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4194 (Conference Report accompanying Tax Reform Act of 1986)).
101. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988) provides that the gain or loss realized from the sale or other
disposition of property is measured as the difference between the amount realized on the disposition and the property's adjusted basis.
1R.C. § 101 l(a) (1988) provides that the adjusted basis for purposes of § 1001(a) is the basis,
as determined under the appropriate basis section of the Code (see, eg., I.R.C. § 1012 (1988)
(basis equals cost unless another basis provision applies); I.R.C. § 1014 (1988) (basis of property
acquired from a decedent); I.R.C. § 1015 (1988) (basis of property acquired by gift); I.R.C. § 332
(1988) (basis of property received in corporate liquidation); I.R.C. § 722 (1988) (basis of contributing partner's partnership interest) (adjusted as provided by I.R.C. § 1016 (West Supp. 1990)).
Section 1016(a) provides for a reduction in basis for various items including deductions taken
for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion deducted under sections
of the Code such as I.R.C. § 167 (West Supp. 1990). The reduction amount required is the
greater of the amount (1) allowed as a deduction to the extent the deduction resulted in a tax
benefit or (2) the amount allowable under the Code for the applicable years. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1016-3 (1960).
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provided for a deduction from gross income of 60 percent of a taxpayer's net capital gains, thus providing for what was in effect a lower
capital gains tax rate. Section 1245 was designed to prevent a taxpayer
from taking advantage of this lower capital gains rate with respect to
any gain that arose simply because of depreciation in excess of the
actual diminution in value of the asset. Thus, if an asset were
purchased for $20,000 and depreciation deductions of $6800 were
taken over a three-year period, the asset's adjusted basis would be
$13,200. If the asset had then been sold before January 1, 1987, for its
fair market value of $16,000, section 1245 would have prohibited the
taxpayer from characterizing the $2800 gain as section 1231 gain subject to the long-term capital gain rate and would have required her to
treat it as ordinary income. If the asset's actual value had appreciated
as the asset had been depreciated, and if the asset had been sold before
1987 for $25,000 (rather than $16,000), the entire amount of the earlier depreciation deductions ($6800) would have been treated as ordinary income and the rest of the gain ($5000) would have received the
benefit of the lower rate prescribed by section 1202. The amount of
gain converted by section 1245 into ordinary income is said to have
been "recaptured." Without the adjustment required by section 1245,
the taxpayer would have received the full benefit of three years of depreciation deductions from ordinary income and then, in effect, have
recovered the entire (or partial, in my first example) amount of the
earlier deduction at the lower capital gains rate.10 2 Section 1245 ensures that the recovery (or recapture) occurs at ordinary income rates.
The practical motivation for a provision like section 1245 is clear
enough - to prevent a taxpayer from both receiving capital gains
treatment on the sale of a business asset and recovering his cost for the
asset out of ordinary income.103 This motivation arose because of the
102. But cf Kahn, supra note 35, at 46-53 for an argument that the assumptions that underlie recapture are misguided.
103. The legislative history of I.R.C. § 1245 confirms this underlying motivation. Testifying

before the Senate Finance Committee before the section was adopted, the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, said:
The President recommended that capital gain treatment be withdrawn from gains on the
disposition of depreciable property, both real and personal, to the extent of prior deprecia-

tion allowances.
Such gain reflects depreciation allowances in excess of the actual decline in value of the

asset and under the President's proposal would be treated as ordinary income. Any gain in
excess of the cost of the asset would still be treated as capital gain. This reform would
eliminate an unfair tax advantage which the law today gives to those who depreciate property at a rate in excess of the actual decline in market value and then proceed to sell the
property, thus, in effect, converting ordinary income into a capitalgain. It is particularly
essential at this time in view of the impending administrative revision of depreciation
guidelines.

Revenue Act of 1962: Hearingson H.R. 10650 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,87th Cong.,
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special rate for long-term capital gains and goes away without it. °0
But even though the practical motivation for a special recapture provision seems to hinge on the rate differential brought about by a capital
gains preference, the function of the provision within the structure of
the income tax system is somewhat broader and can be described quite
independently of that difference. Section 1245, together with the provisions which set forth the procedures for reducing basis to reflect deductions taken for depreciation, 10 5 is a corrective device. When a
taxpayer recovers the cost (or a portion of it) of an asset which it ac10 6 it
quired for business purposes by taking depreciation deductions,
has taken a deduction - fully authorized by the federal income tax
system - which, in rough theory at least, presumes a future outcome;10 7 namely, that the taxpayer will use the asset (for business purposes) and that it will ultimately consume at least as much of the value
of the asset through that use as it has deducted through the mechanism of depreciation.10 8 As with any presumption about the future,
2d Sess. 87-88 (1962) (emphasis added). See also 2 B. BrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 22, at
55.1; M. CHIRELrEIN, supra note 22, at 18.02(b); Kahn, supra note 35, at 43-46.
104. Actually, I.R.C. § 1245 retains some practical effect in several circumstances. For example, capital gains are still offset by capital losses while ordinary income is offset only to a very
limited extent, see I.R.C. § 1211 (1988). Thus, characterization of gain as ordinary income by
§ 1245 can increase a taxpayer's taxable income by reducing the deductibility of his losses. See
also I.R.C. § 170(e) (1988) (reducing the amount of a charitable contribution of property by the
amount that would not have been long-term capital gain if it had been sold for fair market value);
I.R.C. § 453(i) (1988) (recognizing § 1245 recapture income in the year of the disposition of
property sold in an installment sale).
105. See supra note 101.
106. The historic function of depreciation was to recover the cost of the property being depreciated over the period of its economically useful life. Indeed, the phrase "cost recovery" is
often substituted for "depreciation." See, eg., I.R.C. § 168 (1988) ("Accelerated Cost Recovery
System"). A depreciation deduction has been a part of the federal income tax system since 1909.
See TariffAct of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113. It has been explained by the Supreme Court
as follows:
The depreciation charge permitted as a deduction from the gross income in determining the
taxable income of a business for any year represents the reduction, during the year, of the
capital assets through wear and tear of the plant used. The amount of the allowancefor
depreciationis the sum which should be set asidefor the taxableyear,in order that, at the end
of the useful life of the plant in the business, the aggregateof the sums set aside will (with the
salvage value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the originalcost The theory underlying
this allowance for depreciation is that by using up the plant, a gradual sale is made of it.
The depreciation charged is the measure of the cost of the part which has been sold. When
the plant is disposed of after years of use, the thing then sold is not the whole thing originally acquired. The amount of the depreciation must be deducted from the original cost of
the whole in order to determine the cost of that disposed of in the final sale of properties.
United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1927) (emphasis added).
See also Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). See generally B.
BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 22, at 23.1.1; M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22, at 1 6.08.
For a historical account of depreciation policies, see Lischer, DepreciationPolicy: Whither Thou
Goest, 32 Sw. L.J. 545, 546-71 (1978).
107. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1947).
108. See supra note 106. The original goal of tax depreciation seems to have been to devise
methods by which the actual economic depreciation of the asset would be deducted as it oc-
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this one can turn out to be mistaken. A capital gains preference exac-

erbates the mistake; 10 9 it does not cause it.
A fine-tooled analysis of depreciation is itself a complicated and

controversial undertaking. Depreciation for tax purposes is a mechanism for spreading the deduction of an item's cost over multiple tax
periods. Even in a world with a currency unaffected by inflation or
deflation, where the single goal of depreciation was to deduct as much

of an item's cost in any period as was consumed in that period, it
would still be exceedingly difficult to allocate cost to use accurately.
Much of the difficulty stems from the problem of measuring consumption. We would need to know a variety of things, including the value
of the item at the beginning and end of each accounting period and

how much of that value represented the original cost unaffected by
fluctuations in the market price.110 The project is complicated still

further if additional goals are introduced into the design of the depreciation mechanism. The federal system has in fact used depreciation
schedules as a tool for directing investment behavior since at least
1954,111 and a vast literature addresses the complex questions sur-

rounding both the desirability of that practice and its implementation.11 2 It might well appear, therefore, that reconciliation would ill-

describe what has happened when depreciation is recaptured, because
the amount of depreciation actually taken on an asset is often neither
intended nor believed to be an accurate estimate of the cost that has in
fact been consumed. Indeed, most theorists view the Accelerated Cost
cu-red. See M. GRAEr4,supra note 3, at 391-92. The goal of accuracy eroded over time as
depreciation began to be seen as a vehicle by which investment behavior could be stimulated and
directed. The Code introduced so-called accelerated depreciation methods in 1954, and the Accelerated Cost Recovery System was added to the Code as I.R.C. § 168 in 1981. ACRS shortened the period over which cost recovery would occur even beyond the period permitted by the
earlier accelerated methods. In adding § 168, Congress made it clear that its intent was to stimulate capital investment. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, reprintedin 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 105, 152. Nonetheless, the general notion persists that depreciation's basic justification is as a form of spreading the deductible cost of an asset over time.
109. Measuring the amount of the mistake is a separate and difficult issue.
110. For two quite different views about how, in theory, consumption should be measured,
see M. CHIRELSTEIN, supranote 22, %6.08, at 137-39 (arguing that sinking fund depreciation is
the only theoretically proper method for measuring the economic cost of an asset's use) and
Kahn, supra note 35, at 30-43 (arguing that only some form of accelerated depreciation can
accurately measure the cost of an asset's use); see also Blum, Accelerated Depreciation:A Proper
Allowance for Measuring Net Income?ll, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1172 (1980), and Kahn, Accelerated
Depreciation Revisited -A Reply to Professor Blum, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 1185 (1980).
111. See supra notes 106 and 108.
112. See eg., Auerbach, The New Economics of AcceleratedDpreciation,23 B.C. L. RV.
1327 (1982); Bradford, Issues in the Design ofSavings and Investment Incentives, in DEPRECIATION, INFLATION, AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL

(C. Hulten ed. 1981);

Hulten & Wykoff, Economic Depreciation and Accelerated Depreciation: An Evaluation of the
Conable-Jones10-5-3 Proposal, 34 NATL. TAx J. 45 (1981).
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Recovery System, for example, as accelerating the rate of deduction
beyond the rate of consumption. 113 That was certainly the intention of
Congress.1 14 In light of all this, it hardly seems appropriate to characterize accelerated depreciation deductions as "mistakes."
In my earlier discussion of the distinction between mistakes that
can be undone and mistakes that cannot be, I contrasted choices that
could have been recognized as mistakes when they were made because
all the data necessary for a fully informed decision was at least theoretically available by the time the choice was made with those whose
ultimate resolution was in some sense contingent on the future. 115
These latter choices could not, even in theory, have been decisively
identified as mistakes when they were made. I illustrated the second
kind of mistake with the example of my vacation trip to Kauai and the
unexpected typhoon. 116 But this kind of example does not really capture what has happened when a taxpayer takes fully authorized depreciation deductions in Year 1, only to sell the asset for more than its
adjusted basis in Year 3. The amount of the allowable deduction is in
no way affected by the taxpayer's reasonable belief (or even his knowledge) about the likelihood of his disposing of the asset for more than
its adjusted basis. 117 Neither predictions about the particular taxpayer's circumstances and plans nor predictions about the actual rate
at which the taxpayer will consume the asset are relevant to determining the allowable deduction under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System, since the allowable deduction does not presume to represent an
accurate assessment of an asset's rate of consumption. Thus, a more
apt analogy would be my choosing to go to Kauai because I want to
see a good friend who lives there even though I believe, correctly as it
turns out, on the basis of apparently reliable weather forecasts, that a
typhoon will strike.
Sometimes we choose to satisfy one goal (seeing my friend) at the
likely expense of satisfying another (avoiding typhoons). When it
turns out that we did in fact have to sacrifice the one goal (I was
caught in the typhoon), we might look for some way to mitigate the
situation (some might say "to have our cake and eat it too"). In some
sorts of circumstances, like the typhoon, that may be difficult. But in
113. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 22,

6.08.

114. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 48, reprintedin 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 105, 153.

115. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
117. Indeed heis requiredto adjust his basis downward even if he does not avail himself of an
allowable depreciation deduction. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1988).
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others, it might be easier to make an adjustment, after the fact, which
goes some way toward reconciling the conflicting goals. The recapture
of depreciation is one of these easier adjustments.
Annual accounting sets short-term goals for taxpayers, whereas
the fundamental goal of depreciation is a long-term one - to allow
taxpayers to deduct the full cost of that portion of long-lived assets
which they actually consume for business purposes but to require that
they allocate that cost over multiple tax years. Since the allocation
procedures established by the Code are not a function of either the
particular taxpayer's actual consumption of the asset or his likely
plans for disposing of it, there is the clear possibility of a conflict between his satisfying the depreciation requirements of annual accounting and the long-term goal of deducting the cost of only that portion of
the asset that he has actually consumed. Whatever our expectations,
we can only quantify the full extent of the conflict after the entire history of the taxpayer's ownership of the asset has been determined.
The federal income tax system responds to this quantification by making an adjustment to a taxpayer's income in the year that he actually
does dispose of a not-fully-consumed depreciable asset. The corrective
is not perfect, but it does go some distance toward reconciling the conflict. Whether we call the quantification a "mistake" 118 is of no real
importance, but it does not seem an inappropriate label if we are clear
about the sense of the word that I intend. The adjustment that is
made after the "mistake" has been determined is an instance of what I
mean by reconciliation. Like the tax benefit rule, this adjustment
seeks to reconcile the present with the past presumption (not prediction) about the future (rate of consumption of the depreciated asset) to
make them compatible with one another.
By itself, in fact, section 1245 only addresses the increment of the
mistake that results from the preferred treatment given to capital
gains. Alone, it does not remedy the central problem. That is corrected, to the extent that it is, 119 by adjusting the basis of an asset each
time a depreciation deduction is taken 120 and using the asset's adjusted
basis to measure the asset's value when it is sold or otherwise converted.1 21 Let us return to the examples that illustrated the operation
of section 1245: first, an asset bought for $20,000, depreciated for
118. Albeit a mistake that has in many instances been voluntarily built into our tax system.
119. Recapture in a later year of the excess depreciation of earlier years does not take into
account the time value of the amount by which the taxpayer's earlier taxes were reduced by the

excess depreciation. That amount has, in effect, been loaned to the taxpayer without interest.
120. I.RLC. § 1016(a) (1988). See supra note 101.
121. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988). Seejsupra note 101.

June 1990]

Foundationsof FederalIncome Tax

2071

three years by $6800, and sold for $16,000; second, the same asset sold
for $25,000 instead of $16,000. In both of these examples the adjusted
basis of the asset is $13,200. The amount taken into taxable income
upon the first sale is the difference between $16,000 and $13,200 or
$2800; upon the second, the difference between $25,000 and $13,200
or $11,800. In the first case the entire $2800 represents so-called excess depreciation. In the second case $6800 of the $11,800 does. In
both cases the inclusion of the amount that represents excess depreciation is an instance of reconciliation.

Ill. THE NORMATivE ROLE OF RECONCILIATION
As I have shown, reconciliation is a general corrective device,
available to any tax system that chooses to provide for the possibility
that a reporting decision may be revoked in some way other than by
return amendment. It, like realization, is a mechanism that a tax system might use to determine whether and when to tax amounts it views
as potentially taxable. Each of the preceding examples of phenomena
within the federal income tax system is an instance of reconciliation.
On the other hand, each traditionally has been described in terms that
do not include reconciliation. What distinguishes the descriptions that
make use of reconciliation from those that do not is that they are not
purely descriptive. Recognizing reconciliation allows us to give a unified explanation of a number of features of the federal income tax system, an explanation that relates these features both to one another and
to a schematic functional account of all tax systems.
Another feature of the federal income tax system that profitably
can be discussed in terms of reconciliation is its treatment of loans. 122
Conceiving of the tax treatment of simple borrowing in terms of reconciliation allows us to give a more coherent account of an important
feature of the federal income tax system than is allowed by the traditional conceptual vocabulary. To the extent that coherence is a desirable feature of a tax system, this account is therefore preferable to
others. However, conceiving of the tax treatment of simple borrowing
in terms of reconciliation has implications for one's conception of the
tax treatment of other kinds of loan arrangements as well. In this part
of the article I shall explore those implications in the context of
purchase money mortgages. It turns out, however, that the treatment
of purchase money mortgages that is implied by the coherent account
of simple borrowing is not consistent with the facts of current law. If
122. Although he might not want to associate himself with my actual product, the discussion
of loans which follows was inspired by a remark of Martin Ginsburg's.
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coherence is an overriding value, reform of current law would be warranted. If, on the other hand, coherence is allowed to compete with
other values (assuming that it is a value at all), those values should be
identified and their relative strengths assessed before a justified call for
specific reform could be made.
My choice of the tax treatment of simple borrowing and the implications of coherence for the tax treatment of mortgages as examples is
not accidental. Early in this essay, I referred to Barnett's amicus brief
in Tufts as an example of an argument that relies on rationality as a
sufficient reason for interpreting the law as having certain requirements. 123 Barnett's argument is about the tax treatment of purchase
money mortgages upon the disposition of the asset they were used to
purchase. Ironically, given the importance that he ascribes to the rationality of the tax system, Barnett's own argument seems tacitly to
accept the traditional account of the tax treatment of simple
borrowing.1 24
A.

Simple Borrowing

A system might treat borrowed funds as potentially taxable or not
potentially taxable. The federal income tax system, of course, does not
regard loan proceeds as taxable income to the borrower. 125 This might
mean that the federal system chooses to exclude loans from taxation,
even though it regards them as potentially taxable amounts, or it
might mean that it does not regard them as potentially taxable at all.
The familiar justification for the rule that loan proceeds are not included in taxable income is that the borrower's obligation to repay
126
offsets the amount borrowed and leaves her net worth unaffected.
As she repays, her liability diminishes by the amount of the repayment
and her net worth remains the same. By contrast, however, the federal
system does include borrowed amounts in the basis of any asset they
are used to buy. 127 This treatment is inconsistent with the view that
123. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7.
124. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 4-5.
125. See, eg., Shuster v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1941); Matarese v. Commis-

sioner, 34 T.C.M. 791 (CCH) (1975); Gatlin v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 50 (1936); Stayton v.
Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 940 (1935), nonacq., 1936 C.B. 44; Dilks v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A.
1294 (1929), affd, 69 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1934); Fisher v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 968, 969
(1927), acq., 1928 C.B. 11. One exception to this rule is I.R.C. § 77 (1988), which permits taxpayers to elect to include loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation in gross income.
126. See, eg., Brief for Amicus Curiae,supra note 3, at 3; B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra
note 22, at 6.4.1; M. CIIRELSTIN, supra note 22, 3.01, at 44; M. GRAETZ, supra note 3, at
216; Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to NonrecourseDebt: A Defense of the TraditionalSystem Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 41, 63 (1986); Popkin, The Taxation of
Borrowing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 43 (1980).

127. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). Borrowed amounts are generally includ-
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loan proceeds are not taxable income, since basis is supposed to be a
measure of the after-tax cost of an asset, 12 8 and the borrowed dollars
have neither been taxed nor repaid and, cannot, consistently with the
view that they are not taxable income, be taxed. Despite the inclusion
of untaxed loan proceeds in its measure, basis is nonetheless the
amount used to calculate depreciation deductions. 129 This means, obable in basis whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse. 331 U.S. at 10-11; see also Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (nonrecourse mortgage to be treated as "true" loan);
Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976) (absence of personal
liability does not deprive debt of its bona fide character). In Tufts, the Supreme Court emphasized that Crane had upheld the Commissioner's choice to treat nonrecourse debts as he treated
recourse debt ("The Commissioner might have adopted the theory ... that a nonrecourse mortgage is not true debt .... Because the taxpayer's investment in the property would not include
the nonrecourse debt, the taxpayer would not be permitted to include that debt in basis." 461
U.S. at 308 n.5) and indicated that it was now merely reaffirming Crane ("We express no view as
to whether such an approach would be consistent with the statutory structure and, if so, and
Crane were not on the books, whether that approach would be preferred over Crane'sanalysis."
461 U.S. at 308 n.5 (citations omitted)).
However, the Commissioner may attack nonrecourse indebtedness as lacking in economic
substance if, at the time the debt is incurred, the foreseeable value of the property that secures it
is less than the indebtedness amount, an indication that the borrower will not repay it. See Rice's
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983) (nonrecourse debt invalid since foreseeable value of encumbered property less than principal amount of debt), modified 752 F.2d 89 (4th
Cir. 1985); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980) (foreseeable value of the encumbered
property must make abandonment imprudent for nonrecourse debt to exist), affda, 671 F.2d 316
(9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 752 (1975) (for debt to exist, nonrecourse borrower must have economic incentive to make capital investment in unpaid amount),
affd, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
Inclusion in basis may also be denied if the indebtedness is adjudged contingent on its face.
See, e-g., Fox v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 972 (1983) (notes payable out of proceeds too contingent), affd sub nom., Barnard v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984); Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367 (1969) (contingent on profits), affet per curiam, 451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1971); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963), affd. per curiam, 333 F.2d
653 (2d Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229 (1980) (limited partnership nonrecourse
note payable out of cash flow too contingent).
128. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 1011(a), and 1016(a) (1988), described supra note 101, for the
statutory structure from which this observation is derived. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text. There are notable exceptions to the general conception of basis as representative of
after-tax cost. When a corporation exchanges its own stock (in which it has no basis) for property it recognizes no income. I.R.C. § 1032 (1988). Yet I.R.C. § 362 (1988) provides that the
corporation's basis in the acquired property will be the same as it was in the hands of the transferor, incieased in the amount of gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer. A similar
rule governs the basis of property received by a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. I.R.C. § 723 (1988). See generally Manning, The Issuer'sPaper: Property or What? Zero
Basis and Other Income Tax Mysteries, 39 TAX L. REv. 159 (1984).
129. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1988), the basic authorization provision for depreciation deductions,
provides for the deduction of a "reasonable allowance" for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and
obsolescence of property used in a trade or business or for the production of income. Section
167(g) provides that this deduction must be based on the adjusted basis provided in § 1011. See
supra note 101. Tangible property placed in service after 1980 and before 1987 is subject to the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System rules of old § 168. Under this provision, depreciation deductions are based on the taxpayer's "unadjusted basis" in the property as defined in old § 168(d).
Property placed in service after December 31, 1986 is subject to the rules of current § 168, which
relies on the definition of adjusted basis in § 167(d).
The at-risk rules of I.R.C. § 465 (1988) have the effect of placing some limitations on the
deductibility of depreciation on assets purchased with nonrecourse financing. In general, § 465
limits a taxpayer's annual deductible loss for certain activities engaged in as a trade or business or
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viously enough, that borrowed funds can produce significant tax benefits *(not to mention the significant economic benefit of being able to
130
invest the entire borrowed amount while deferring its repayment)
before they are taxed. 131 For my present purposes, however, the more
important observation is that borrowed funds are a sort of hybrid in
the federal income tax system. For some purposes (e.g., calculating
taxable income) they are not treated as taxable income, while for other
purposes (e.g., cost recovery) they are treated as ff they had been taxable income.
The apparent hybrid character of the tax treatment of loan proceeds suggests that the concern with net worth that characterizes the
justification for noninclusion might not in fact function within the federal income tax system as a factor for distinguishing potentially taxable amounts. Rather, for good reasons or bad, it may function within
the system as an indicator of when to exclude potentially taxable
amounts from taxation. Otherwise, if "no change in net worth" is
taken as seriously meaning "not within the scope of the system" (as
opposed to "excluded from taxable income"), the inclusion of untaxed
loan proceeds in basis represents a genuine systemic incoherence. To
pose the question in terms of the simple structural model of an income
tax system suggested in Part I of this article: 132 Are loan proceeds not
taxed at receipt because they are not even within the purview of the
system, or are they potentially taxable amounts that are excluded from
taxation? If they are conceived of as potentially taxable amounts that
are excluded from taxation (probably because of the offsetting obligation and the resultant sameness of net worth) on the presumption that
repayment will be made, systemic coherence can be preserved. A description of the account that would be given under this analysis of loan
arrangements should illustrate the point.
for the production of income to the amount for which the taxpayer is economically at risk.

When the at-risk rules were added to the Code in 1976, they classified nonrecourse debt as
amounts for which the taxpayer was not at risk. This restriction was considerably modified in
1986. For post-1986 losses with respect to real property, an exception is now provided for "qualified nonrecourse financing." I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (1988). Generally, qualified nonrecourse financ-

ing is nonrecourse financing which has both been provided by an organization that is in the
business of lending and is secured by real estate used in the activity. For an argument that the atrisk concept is wrong in principle, see Coven, supra note 126.
130. See, eg., Popkin, supra note 126, at 44-45.
131. "By holding that nonrecourse liabilities are includable in the taxpayer's basis for property, Crane laid the foundation stone of most tax shelters.. . ." Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonre-

course Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. Rv. 277, 283 (1978). See, eg., M. CHIRELSTEIN,
supra note 22, at %13.01; Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAxEs 719 (1975); McKee, The

RealEstate Tax Shelter. A ComputerizedExposi 57 VA. L. REv. 521 (1971); Popkin, supranote
126.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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If a taxpayer borrows $1000 at a standard rate of interest 33 in
Year 1 and pays back the principal per the loan agreement in a lump
sum five years later, he is not taxed on the $1000 that he borrowed
(although he may well have repaid the loan with funds that have been
taxed, their treatment is entirely a function of their own source). The
suggested analysis would simply describe the taxpayer as having excluded the loan proceeds from taxation on the presumption that repayment in full would be made in the future. If the loan were forgiven in
Year 2, the taxpayer would be taxed on the amount of the forgiven
principal in Year 2. The suggested analysis would explain this result
in terms of reconciliation. The loan proceeds were excluded in Year 1
on the assumption of their future repayment. When that proves false,
the earlier exclusion is corrected by reconciling it with the current situation and including the forgiven amount in Year 2's taxable income.
Year 2's taxable income is not, under this account, a new potentially
taxable amount entering the purview of the income tax system for the
first time because of the increase in the taxpayer's net worth. Reconciliation allows us to account coherently for the current treatment of
simple borrowing and discharge of indebtedness.
B.

PurchaseMoney Mortgages, Footnote 37 and the Issue in Tufts

This analysis of simple borrowing, consistently applied, implies an
analysis of purchase money mortgages. If the $1000 loan in the above
example were a purchase money mortgage, and the asset acquired
were sold later for an amount that included the assumption of the
mortgage liability, the implied analysis of the loan relief would be
stated similarly in terms of reconciliation.
1. The Implications of Coherence
Consider, then, a range of illustrative cases. In each of these examples assume, unless otherwise specified, that the asset held by the taxpayer is nondepreciable, that the sale takes place in Year 3, and that
the outstanding principal on the loan remains $1000.
133. Assume here, and throughout the discussion infra of examples A-M(NR), that the interest payments are based on a fixed rate and are unconditionally payable during the term of the
loan at six-month intervals. This assumption will allow the discussion to proceed schematically

without the added (but unnecessary for my purposes) complexity introduced by the original issue
discount rules of I.R.C. §§ 1271-75 (1988 & West Supp. 1990). For a detailed analysis of how
the original issue discount rules work see McCawley, Time Value ofMoney: OID and Imputed

Interest, 333-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1990).
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Asset
Basis = $1000

FMV = $1200
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional
$200 to acquire the asset.
This transaction, like any sale, has two conceptually distinct components to be accounted for by each taxpayer - the amount received
and the amount given up. Here the seller has given up an asset with a
basis of $1000 and has received relief from a liability of $1000 plus
$200 in cash.13 4 Each of these components can be separately analyzed.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1200 for
an asset in which he had a basis of $1000. He realizes $200 gain.
2. The liability reliefreceived: At the time the loan was incurred
the taxpayer had excluded the amount of the proceeds ($1000) from
his income on the presumption that he would later repay that amount
in its entirety. Here the taxpayer is giving up an asset worth $1200 to
receive relief from the $1000 liability plus $200 in cash. Put another
way, the taxpayer is repaying the $1000 liability in full, as per the
earlier presumption, and so no corrective measure is appropriate.
EXAMPLE B
Mortgage Liability
Asset
Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
FMV = $900
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset
plus an additional $100.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1000 in
exchange for an asset in which he had a basis of $1000 and an additional $100 in cash. He received $900 for the asset alone and thus he
realizes a loss of $100.
2. The liability reliefreceived: The taxpayer is giving up an asset
worth $900, along with another $100 in cash, in exchange for relief
from a $1000 liability. Thus he is repaying the liability in full, consistent with the presumption behind the original exclusion of the $1000
loan proceeds.
134. For an analysis of this and the next three examples from the purchaser's perspective see
infra text accompanying notes 151-57.
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Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
$800 = cost to
FMV = $1000
discharge at time of
sale [or amount one
could now borrow
on the same terms]
(!e., the prevailing
interest rate for
similar loans has
gone up)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional
$200 to acquire the asset.
1. The assetgiven up: Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the
seller only receives $1000 of value for the asset. This can be seen if one
focuses on the value of the assumed mortgage liability from the purchaser's perspective. Because interest rates have risen in the three
years since the original loan was taken out, it would cost an additional
$200 now to borrow $1000. This means that a promise now to abide
by the repayment terms of the earlier loan would only finance a loan of
roughly $800 and that it would therefore cost the purchaser an additional $200 simply to relieve the seller of the liability of $1000.
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer gives up an asset
worth $1000 in order to be relieved of a $1000 liability and receive
$200 in cash. When he originally excluded the $1000 loan proceeds he
did so on the presumption that he would repay the full amount. In
fact he is satisfying his entire liability for only $800. The premise behind the earlier exclusion has therefore turned out to be mistaken.
The mistake can be ameliorated by reconciling the current year's repayment of $800 with the earlier year's presumption of repayment and
consequent exclusion of $1000. This results in $200 being included in
the current year's taxable income.
At least two things should be noted about this analysis. First,
although its practical consequences are less in a system without a special tax rate for long-term capital gains than they would be in one
whose rate structure distinguished between kinds of taxable income,1 3 5
the $200 gain to the taxpayer resultsfrom the sale of the asset but does
not represent gain from that sale associated with the appreciation of
the asset. The analysis therefore implies that if the asset were a capital
135. See supra note 101.
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asset, the $200 would not be long-term capital gain. This is in contrast
to current federal income tax law. Current federal law does not, in
fact, bifurcate transactions of this sort as the analysis suggests. 136 Instead, relying on Crane's137 inclusion of theface value of any mortgage
liability assumed by the purchaser as part of the seller's amount realized (and ignoring the fact that the cost to discharge the mortgage
liability has changed), it simply focuses on the asset. Thus, the asset in
Example C has a basis of $1000 and the seller has received $1200 (face
value of the mortgage liability assumed plus the additional $200) for
it.138 The gain is characterized as gain from the sale of the asset capital gain if the asset was a capital asset.
Second, under the suggested analysis, the $200 gain does not represent a newly realized potentially taxable amount. Rather, it represents
an amount that was excluded from taxable income when it was first
identified as potentially taxable but which, in the light of the future
that has come to be, should not be excluded after all. Its current
recognition is not a fumction of its being newly realized but of the current reconciliation of the present situation with mistaken past
presumptions.
EXAMPLE D
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $1100
FMV = $1000
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone down.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset

plus $100.
1. The asset given up: For reasons analogous to those given in
this part of the discussion of Example C, the purchaser could borrow
roughly $1100 at Year 3's lower interest rate for the same total cost
that he would have incurred to borrow $1000 three years earlier. This
means that in an arm's length transaction he would require $1100 of
value in exchange for his assumption of the three-year-old mortgage
liability. Here, he receives $100 in cash and the asset, which must be
136. However, if the lender conditioned the purchaser's assumption of the mortgage liability
on the modification of its terms, I.R.C. § 1274(c)(4) (West Supp. 1990) and Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1274-1(c), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,082 (1986), appear to bifurcate the transaction in a highly stylized
way by treating the modified mortgage liability as a new mortgage liability which was exchanged

for the original mortgage liability.
137. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
138. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (1980).
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valued at $1000. Since the seller-taxpayer's basis in the asset is $1000,
he has no gain or loss with respect to the asset.
2. The liability relief received: The seller gives up both an asset
worth $1000 and an additional $100 to be relieved of a $1000 liability.
He has thus fully repaid the $1000 which was earlier excluded from
his taxable income on the presumption of later repayment. There is no
mistake to correct, and hence no reconciliation is needed. He has, of
course, spent an additional $100 in order to procure the liability relief.
A system could choose to characterize that expenditure as deductible
or not.
Again, current federal income tax law yields a different result. It
ignores the fact that the cost required to discharge the mortgage has
changed, and simply treats this transaction as the exchange of cash
and an asset with a total basis of $1100 for mortgage relief of $1000.
The result is a $100 asset loss. The bifurcation of the transaction into
its "asset given up" side and its "liability relief received" side is a logical consequence of the suggestion that the apparent incoherence of the
federal system's exclusion from tax of borrowed amounts and its concurrent inclusion of them in the basis of assets that they are used to
acquire could be cured by conceiving of borrowed amounts as having
been excluded from taxation on the presumption that full repayment
would be made in the future. The inclusion in income of forgiven loan
amounts could therefore be accounted for as instances of
reconciliation.
As I indicated earlier, Barnett, in his Tufts amicus brief conceives
of cases of this sort as requiringbifurcated analysis. 139 In his view, it is
irrational to ignore the fact that the value of a liability can vary just as
the value of any asset can. Thus he posits the general rule that "the
gain or loss realized by a purchase of relief from a liability is equal to
the difference between the adjusted basis of the liability and the
amount expended for the relief."' 14° According to Barnett, the amount
of "the obligor's prior receipt for accepting the liability [is] his basis
for the liability." 14 1 Barnett values systemic rationality highly. There
is some evidence that he regards it as a sufficient reason for interpreting the law as in fact providing one thing rather than another. 14 2
Nonetheless, his own analysis does not proceed from concern that the
federal system's basic treatment of simple borrowing is systemically
incoherent. Indeed, he seems to accept the net worth rationale with139.
140.
141.
142.

See supra text accompanying note 6.
Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 5.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.

2080

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:2034

out question.1 43 As a result, Barnett's bifurcated analysis is somewhat
different from the one I am spelling out here. In each of the preceding
examples, Barnett would analyze the liability relief received in terms
of the taxpayer's basis in the liability (its face value in these examples)
and the amount expended to procure relief. When the taxpayer, like
the taxpayer in Example C, gives up assets worth less than the face
value of the liability, he will realize liability gain in the amount of the
difference between the face value of the liability and what he gave up
for the liability relief alone, $200 of ordinary income in Example C.
This amount, and its characterization, should always be the same as
that yielded by my analysis even though the descriptions of what has
happened differ. However, when the taxpayer, like the taxpayer in
Example D, gives up assets worth more than the face value of the
liability in exchange for relief from the liability, the two analyses yield
interestingly different results. Under Barnett's analysis, such a taxpayer would realize a liability loss in the amount of the difference between what he gave up in exchange for relief from the liability and his
basis in the liability (face value). This would be a $100 liability loss in
Example D. My reconciliation analysis, by contrast, does not regard
the taxpayer as having suffered a loss. He has simply spent $100 more
to procure liability relief than he expected to.
Example D is related to Example B just as C is to A. The form of
the transaction in D is identical to that in B, just as that of C is identical to that in A. The difference in the analyses of the hypotheticals
within each pair is entirely a function of whether either the value of
the asset has changed from Year 1 to Year 3 or the prevailing interest
rate for a purchase money mortgage of $1000 is different in Year 3
from what it was in Year 1. One of the two variables remains constant
in each of the four hypotheticals. In the next four hypotheticals, both
the value of the property and the prevailing interest rate have changed.
EXAMPLE E
MortgageLiability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $800
FMV = $1100
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone up.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional
$300 to acquire the asset.
1. The asset given up: For precisely the same reasons as those
143. Brief for Amicus Curiae,supra note 3, at 3.
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given in this part of the discussion of Example C, the seller here has
received $1100 of value for the asset; $800 associated with the loan
assumption and $300 in cash. Since the asset's basis was $1000 he
realized a $100 gain.
2. The liability relief recovered: The taxpayer repays a total of
$800 of the previously excluded $1000 loan. He gives up an asset
worth $1100 in exchange for relief from $1000 of liability plus an additional $300 in cash. Reconciliation would square the previous assumption with the actual resolution of the debt and include $200 in
Year 3's taxable income.
For the reasons discussed above, Barnett's analysis would yield the
same results. Federal income tax law currently lumps the asset gain
and the liability gain together and characterizes all $300 as asset gain.
By now the pattern of the analysis should be clear.
EXAMPLE F
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Basis = $1000
Face value = $1000
FMV = $900
Cost to discharge = $800
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone up.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional
$100 to acquire the asset.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer has received value of $800
(mortgage liability assumed) plus $100 (cash), or $900. Loss on the
asset equals $100.
2. The liability reliefreceived: $1000 of relief received at a cost of
$900 (asset) less $100 (cash received) equals $800. Reconciliation gain
is $200.
Barnett's result would be the same. Federal law offsets the gain
against the loss and calls it $100 asset gain.
EXAMPLE G
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Basis = $1000
Face value = $1000
FMV = $1100
Cost to discharge = $1100
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone down.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the asset.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1100
(mortgage liability assumed). Gain on the asset equals $100.
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2. The liabilityrelief received: $1000 of previously excluded loan
receipts are repaid with the equivalent of $1100. No reconciliation is
called for (see the discussion in part 2 of Example D).
Barnett's analysis would differ exactly as it did in Example D and
treat this as $100 asset gain and $100 liability loss. Under current law
no gain or loss would be recognized.
EXAMPLE H
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Basis = $1000
Face value = $1000
FMV = $900
Cost to discharge = $1100
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone down.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset
plus an additional $200.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer receives value of $1100
(mortgage liability assumed) less $200 (cash paid), or $900. Loss on
the asset equals $100.
2. The liability reliefreceived: $1000 of relief is received at a cost
of $900 (asset) plus $200 (cash) equals $1100. No reconciliation is
called for.
Barnett would treat the seller as sustaining $100 asset loss and
$100 liability loss. The federal income tax treats the seller as having a
$200 asset loss.
A central tenet of federal income tax law ever since Crane was
decided in 1947 has been that it does not distinguish between recourse
and nonrecourse borrowing. 144 Thus, Crane held that the amount realized by someone who sells mortgaged property includes the face
amount of the mortgage, regardless of whether the seller is personally
liable for the debt. A corollary of this holding has been that the taxpayer's basis in the property includes the amount of any purchase
money mortgage. However, the analysis of purchase money mortgages implied by the "reconciliation" analysis of simple borrowing
suggests distinguishing between recourse and nonrecourse mortgages
in some contexts.
If the purchase money mortgage is a nonrecourse loan, secured by
the asset whose fair market value has dropped, the taxpayer would
have no economic motivation to compensate a purchaser by paying
him the difference between the face value of the loan and the fair mar144. See supra notes 5 and 13 1. For a concise and informative history of the tax treatment of
nonrecourse debt in the federal income tax, see Shaviro, 44 TAX L. REv. 401, 420-27 (1989).
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ket value of the asset. He does not need the purchaser in order to
satisfy his obligation, but can simply turn the asset over to the lender/
secured-interest holder. This fact suggests an important distinction
between the presumptions that underlie recourse and nourecourse
purchase money mortgages.
Under the analysis that I have suggested, when someone borrows
money, excludes it, but nonetheless includes the amount of the loan in
the basis of the asset that it is used to acquire, a presumption is made.
When the loan is a recourse loan, the presumption is that its face
amount will be repaid in full. As Examples C, E, and F have illustrated, sometimes loans can be discharged for less than their face
value. When this occurs, the analysis suggests that an adjustment
might be made to the taxpayer's current ordinary income to reconcile
actual events with the earlier presumption about the resolution of the
loan.
But, when the loan is a nonrecourse loan, the presumption is
slightly different: the face amount of the loan will be repaid in full as
long as the fair market value of the property that secures it does not
drop below the face amount of the loan. Otherwise, the loan will be
repaid to the extent of the fair market value of the underlying property. The presumption, therefore, has two parts. First, like the case of
a recourse loan, a presumption is made about the future cost of discharging the obligation. If this turns out not to be accurate, reconciliation might be appropriate. Second, and unlike the case of a recourse
loan, an additional presumption is made about the future value of the
asset acquired with the loan proceeds. The presumption is that the
full face amount of the loan represents the appropriate amount to include in the asset's basis, because the fair market value of the asset will
not fall below that face amount and the amount of after-tax investment in the asset (attributable to the loan) will thus turn out to be the
face amount of the loan rather than a lesser amount. If this presumption turns out to be inaccurate, 145 the remedy might be to adjust the
taxpayer's amount realizedfor the asset to reconcile actual events with
145. Current federal income tax doctrine distinguishes between "true" debt and contingent
debt. A number of courts have upheld the Internal Revenue Service's contention that an inadequately secured nonrecourse loan is too contingent to be characterized as debt includable in the
basis of the asset which secures it. Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 CB 58; see, eg., Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d
89 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). My analysis of the
two-part presumption underlying the inclusion of a nonrecourse loan in the securing asset's basis
involves a different kind of contingency. Traditional contingent loan concerns center on uncertainty about the value of the securing asset at the time that it is acquired. This is hardly surprising since the issue invariably arises in the context in which the lender and the seller of the asset
are the same taxpayer. The contingency which characterizes my presumption involves uncertainty about the value of the securing asset at the time that it is sold
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the earlier presumptions that the fair market value of the asset would
not drop below the face amount of the loan that it secured.
Consider three more hypotheticals. ("NR" indicates that the loan
is nonrecourse.)
EXAMPLE I (NR)
MortgageLiability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $1000
FMV = $900
No purchaser would reasonably assume the mortgage liability.
Taxpayer abandons the asset to mortgagee and is thereby relieved of
his obligation.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer's basis in the asset is the
amount of the loan that it is presumed will be repaid. Precisely speaking, that amount should be the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value
of the asset at the time of its disposition or abandonment. Less precisely speaking, the basis is presumed to be $1000. The basis has, in
effect, been "rounded up" to the only determinable amount available
at the time that the asset is acquired. When the fair market value of
the asset drops to $900 and the taxpayer abandons the asset to the
mortgagee, it becomes apparent that the presumption of $1000 has
turned out to be incorrect, even though the more precisely stated presumption was correct. The current situation could be reconciled with
the earlier presumption either by adjusting current income directly or
by making an adjustment to the taxpayer's current basis in the asset.
Adjusting basis to reflect the fact that the fair market value of the asset
at the time of its disposition turned out to be less than the face amount
of the loan would result, here, in a basis of $900, and there would be
no gain or loss on the abandonment of the asset.
2. The liability reliefreceived: The taxpayer has been relieved of
a liability equal to the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value of the
asset that secures it. He has achieved this relief by giving up the securing asset. He has thus repaid the liability in full, consistent with the
repayment assumptions behind the original exclusion of the loan
proceeds.
Example I(NR) is similar to Example B. Because his loan was a
recourse liability, however, the seller in B could not simply abandon
the devalued asset to the mortgagee without further consequence.
Thus, he had to pay an additional $100 to a purchaser to be rid of the
obligation.
Example I(NR) is familiar to tax lawyers as the case whose out-
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come was left in doubt by the Supreme Court in its famous footnote 37
to the Crane decision:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be
encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it
subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case. 14 6
Thirty-six years later in Tufts, 14 7 the Supreme Court finally returned to that case. Its answer was somewhat anticlimactic. Since
Crane does not distinguish generally between recourse and nonrecourse loans, and since Crane always includes in a seller's amount realized the face amount of any recourse liability assumed by a
purchaser, the face amount of any nonrecourse debt assumed or forgiven (the practical effect of abandonment) should be included in a
seller's amount realized as well. 148 The result in Example I(NR) is
that the taxpayer recognizes no gain or loss on the abandonment of the
asset because he is conceived as having realized $1000 for an asset in
which his basis is also $1000. Although the rationale is different, the
same result is suggested by the above analysis. Barnett's result would
be the same as well.
EXAMPLE J (NR)
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Basis = $1000
Face value = $1000
FMV = $800
Cost to discharge = $800
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone up.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the asset.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer's basis in the asset should be
described in exactly the same way as the taxpayer's basis in the asset in
Example I(NR) was. Since the fair market value of the asset at the
time of its disposition had dropped to $800, the original basis was, in
effect, overstated by $200. As seller, the taxpayer is receiving value of
$800 (current cost to discharge the mortgage) for an asset whose basis
is $1000 but whose adjusted basis, as things turned out, should be
$800. Reconciliation could correct for the basis overstatement by disallowing the $200 asset loss that would otherwise be indicated by this
bifurcated form of analysis.
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer has satisfied an obli146. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947).
147. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
148. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10.
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gation to repay the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value of the asset
that secures it, for the lattei amount. There is no mistake to correct,
nor is there any gain or loss to recognize.
Once again, this result is consistent with Crane and Tufts. The
taxpayer would recognize no gain or loss on the transaction because he
would have exchanged an asset with a basis of $1000 for relief from a
$1000 liability. Barnett's analysis, on the other hand, since it does not
distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse loans, would treat the
taxpayer as having realized a $200 asset loss and a $200 liability gain.
EXAMPLE K (NR)
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $800
FMV = $900
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone up.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional
$100 to acquire the asset.
1. The asset given up: The taxpayer has received value of $900.
The basis was thus overstated by $100, and there is no gain or loss.
2. The liability relief received: $900 of liability satisfied for $900
(fair market value of asset) less $100 (cash received) equals $800.
Gain is $100.
This is the same set of facts as those in Example F, except that the
loan is nonrecourse. Since neither Barnett nor (in this context) current federal practice distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse
loans, their analyses of Example K(NR) would not differ from their
analyses of Example F.
It is important not to lose sight of the point of the suggested analysis. This analysis follows from an account of simple borrowing that
can account for the hybrid treatment of loan proceeds by the federal
income tax system without inherent incoherency. Since loan proceeds
used to purchase a depreciable asset are included in the asset's basis,
they are treated, for that purpose at least, as taxable income within the
federal system. This flies in the face of any account of loans, like the
net worth account, that explains their nontaxation by distinguishing
them from taxable income.
Tufts forces us to confront the incoherence directly. It involves an
asset whose original basis included the face amount of a purchase
money mortgage, whose adjusted basis reflected depreciation deductions, and whose fair market value at the time of its sale was less than
the face value of the loan assumed by the purchaser. The following
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two hypotheticals are representative of facts like Tufts'. Example L
assumes a recourse loan. Example M(NR) assumes a nonrecourse
loan.
EXAMPLE L
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Original basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $800 Depreciation deductions taken = $200
Adjusted basis = $800
FMV = $800
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has gone up.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the asset.
1. The asset given up: The current cost to discharge a $1000
mortgage at Year l's interest rate is $800. The value received by the
seller is therefore $800, and he realizes no gain or loss.
2. The liability relief received: The taxpayer-seller has repaid a
$1000 loan with an asset worth $800. Thus, the $1000 loan proceeds
that were excluded in Year 1 on the assumption that they would be
repaid in full, have been repaid with only $800. Reconciliation corrects for the mistake and prescribes a $200 gain.
EXAMPLE M (NR)
Mortgage Liability
Asset
Face value = $1000
Original basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $800 Depreciation deductions taken = $200
Adjusted basis = $800
FMV = $800
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has gone up.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability in exchange for the asset.
1. The assetgiven up: The original basis of the asset turns out to
have been, in effect, overstated by $200. If one ignores for the moment
the added complications of the effect of that overstatement on the depreciation deductions taken, reconciliation would suggest that the adjusted basis should be thought of as $600, and a $200 asset gain would
seem to have been realized. Depreciation, however, complicates the
answer in two ways. First, if we assume that there is no need to reconcile for the extra depreciation that resulted from the overstatement in
the original basis, the gain that reconciliation suggests might well be
treated as properly characterized in accordance with 'the applicable
rules for the recapture of excess depreciation. 149 Theoretically anyway, all excess depreciation should be taken into income, characterized just as it was when it was taken out. Second, there is the issue of
149. For a schematic description of the role of a recapture rule see supra text accompanying
notes 101-02.
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how to adjust for the fact that the actual depreciation was based on an
inflated basis. If a goal of reconciliation is to be wholly corrective,
then the proper way to think of the new adjusted basis is as it would
have been had the original basis been $800 and had depreciation deductions been calculated and taken accordingly. This would result in
a revised adjusted basis of something more than $600. On the one
hand, this would reduce the asset gain subject to the recapture of depreciation rules by the amount of adjusted basis in excess of $600. On
the other hand, it would introduce the need to reconcile for the fact
that exactly this much extra depreciation was taken as a result of the
inflated basis.
2. The liabilityrelief received: The taxpayer-seller has repaid his
loan in accordance with the presumptions that governed its terms Le., with the lesser of $1000 or the fair market value of the underlying
asset at the time of its disposition. No gain or loss is realized, and no
reconciliation is appropriate.
Tufts held that the taxpayer in this situation should be treated as
having realized asset gain equal to the difference between his adjusted
basis ($800) and the face value of the mortgage liability relief he received ($1000). This $200 would likely be characterized either as capital gain or section 1231 gain, depending on the nature of the asset.
Any portion of the gain that represented excess depreciation would
1 50
presumably be recaptured in accordance with the applicable rules.
This is very nearly the same result as that yielded by the suggested
analysis. Barnett's bifurcation analysis, on the other hand, results in
no asset gain or loss and a $200 liability gain.
If we are serious about systemic coherence, and insist on it
throughout our analysis of borrowed funds, its implications turn out
to be different in some circumstances, including Tufts itself, from
those claimed by Barnett. And although the results of our coherent
analysis differ from current federal income tax law in the context of
many recourse loans, they are remarkably similar in the context of
nonrecourse loans.
2. A Significant Cost of Coherence
Systemic rationality and coherence may well be desirable for a tax
system to have. Most of us are doubtless inclined, at least, to think so.
But other features might be desirable for our tax system as well. Unless we can show generally that systemic coherence trumps all other
values - an argument that does not get made, even by those, like
150. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303 n.2.
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Barnett, who seem to think that systemic rationality and coherence
provide sufficient reason for interpreting the law one way rather than
another - normative arguments about a tax system must articulate
and weigh a variety of values. Hence, even if the implications of coherence are as described in the previous section, I have not yet made
the case for reforming current law to conform to my rationale and
results.15 1 Indeed, it is not my aim here to make that case, but rather
to show something about how recognizing the necessary functions of
any tax system can help both in describing our own income tax system
and in structuring normative arguments about it. In any case, one
should note that the administrative cost of the preceding analysis of
purchase money mortgages would be considerable. Just how considerable can begin to be seen by revisiting Examples A through D above,
this time analyzing them from the perspective of the purchaser.
EXAMPLE A,
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $1000
FMV = $1200
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional
$200 to acquire the asset.
1. The assetpurchased: The purchaser has purchased an asset at
a cost of $1200. His basis in the asset should be $1200.
2. The liability incurred: The purchaser has, in effect, borrowed
$1000 of his $1200 purchase price. The borrowed $1000 is not currently taxed on the assumption that the taxpayer will repay it in the
future.
EXAMPLE Bp
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $1000
FMV = $900
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset
plus an additional $100.
1. The assetpurchased: The purchaser has bought an asset for a
net cost of $900 and, accordingly, his basis in the asset should be $900.
2. The liability incurred: The purchaser has borrowed $1000
which he has used to acquire $1000 of value (an asset worth $900 plus
151. Since my results conform fairly well to both Crane and Tufts, such reform is not impossibly impractical.
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$100 in cash). This amount is not currently taxed on the assumption
that it will be repaid in the future.
EXAMPLE Cp
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Basis = $1000
Face value = $1000
Cost to discharge = $800
FMV = $1000
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone up.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and pays an additional
$200 to acquire the asset.
1. The asset purchased: The purchaser has acquired an asset
worth $1000. One would, therefore, expect the purchase price to have
been $1000. In fact, it was, since he paid $200 cash and agreed to pay
an amount equivalent to the amount he would have to pay had he
borrowed $800 for the same term at current interest rates. 15 2 If basis
represents cost, the purchaser's basis in the asset should be $1000. But
the face value of the mortgage is $1000, and that amount plus the
additional cash which he paid would appear to give the purchaser a
$1200 basis.
2. The liabilityincurred: By undertaking the mortgage obligation
the purchaser has achieved a current purchasing power of $800. This
amount is not currently taxed on the assumption that it will be repaid
in the future. But, once again, it must be noted that the face value of
the liability is $1000. If the value of the liability were measured by its
purchasing power at the time it was undertaken ($800), then the face
value of the loan ($1000) would not be the standard against which
future dispositions of the loan would be offset. If, for example, two
years later, the asset was still worth $1000 and the face value of the
unpaid mortgage was still $1000153 but its cost to discharge was now
also $1000,154 the sale of the asset by the person I have called "the
purchaser" for relief from the liability would seem to result in no gain
or loss on the asset but in a $200 loss on the liability. In effect, the
purchaser would have spent $1000 (his basis in the asset) in order to
be relieved of what, in his hands, had started out to be an $800 debt.
On the other hand, if the value of the liability were measured by its
face value, regardless of fluctuations in its purchasing power, then the
152. See supra discussion of Example C.
153. Perhaps because its terms required periodic interest payments with a balloon payment
of the principal at some future date.
154. Perhaps because current market interest rates for similar loans had returned to those
originally set forth by the terms of the loan.
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purchaser's basis in the asset would be $1200 and the transaction in
this example would result in neither gain nor loss on the liability, but
in a $200 loss on the asset.
EXAMPLE Dp
Mortgage Liability

Asset

Face value = $1000
Basis = $1000
Cost to discharge = $1100
FMV = $1000
(The prevailing interest rate for similar loans has
gone down.)
Purchaser assumes the mortgage liability and acquires the asset
plus an additional $100.
1. The assetpurchased: The purchaser has bought an asset worth
$1000 and has been given $100 as well. Clearly, a fair price for this
package would be $1100. Because the purchaser agreed to pay back
an amount equivalent to the amount he would have to repay had he
borrowed $1100 for the same term at current interest rates, it would be
reasonable to assign him, a basis of $1000 in the asset (his cost less the
$100 he received with the asset). If the face value of the mortgage is
determinative of basis, the buyer's basis in the asset would be $900
($1000 obligation assumed less $100 cash received).
2. The liability incurred: The purchaser here is in a position
analogous to that of the purchaser in Example Cp. He has undertaken
to pay back an amount equal to the amount he would have to repay
had he borrowed $1100. This gives him a current purchasing power of
$1100. He is not taxed currently because it is assumed that he will
repay in the future. This example, no less than Example Cp, illustrates
how the standard against which future dispositions of the loan are
measured can differ from the loan's face value if the acquired asset is
given a basis equal to its value and actual cost (here $1000) and the
loan assumption is viewed as having contributed its actual purchasing
power (here $1100) to the transaction.
Bifurcation of transactions that involve both the exchange of an
asset and the exchange of a liability would seem to require that the
value of the liability be adjusted to reflect its current cost to discharge.
If face value were always used as the measure of the value of the liability, then there could be no fluctuation in the value of any given liability155 and bifurcation would have no effective role. All gains and
losses would be represented as attaching to the exchange of the asset.
155. Of course, the amount of the liability could change as it was partially paid or as additional amounts were borrowed, but such changes are not fluctuations in the value of a given
liability.
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The seller in Example C would be said to have sold the asset for $1200
(even though its fair market value was only $1000 and even though
someone who paid fair price in any currency other than the assumption of the outstanding mortgage liability would be treated as having
paid $1000) and thereby as having realized a $200 gain on the asset.
Consistently with that result,1 56 the buyer in Example Cp would be
given a $1200 basis in the asset. As the preceding discussion has
shown, on the whole, the current federal income tax system in fact
operates in this manner. It tends to treat the increase or decrease in
the value of any liability relinquished or assumed in connection with
an asset sale as if it had been assimilated into the price of the asset
157
itself.
The actual purchasing power of a particular liability can fluctuate,
however, as a result of differences in the prevailing interest rates. As
long as these fluctuations are not accorded any special significance by
the tax system, the system can operate using the dollar as a fungible
standard for measuring gain, loss, and income. If bifurcation of the
sort spelled out in Examples A through M(NR) were adhered to, and
for tax purposes, the value of a liability were not automatically pegged
to its face value but face value nonetheless governed the relationship
between debtor and creditor, then accounting for the tax consequences
of satisfying assumed obligations would become a different enterprise.
Essentially, the face value of the dollar paid to satisfy an obligation
would cease to function as the measure of the amount paid to satisfy
the obligation. The complications arise because bifurcation allows a
value different from the face value to be assigned to a liability for tax
purposes, even though face value will necessarily continue to represent
the amount that the borrower is contractually due to pay to the holder
of the note. Thus, in Example Cp, if, three years after he had assumed
it as part of his purchase price for the asset, the buyer were to pay off
the entire outstanding mortgage liability of $1000 as per the terms of
the original note, his tax treatment would vary in accordance with the
purchasing power of the dollar. If its purchasing power at the end of
three years were the same as it had been anticipated at the beginning
of Year 1 that it would be, then paying off the debt with 1000 Year-3
dollars would not have any tax consequences, even though the loan
156. Consistency in the treatment of buyer and seller seems, at the least, a desirable feature.

Coven apparently thinks that it is a necessary one. See Coven, supra note 126, at 77; see also
Brief for Amicus Curiae,supra note 3, at 20. Without such consistency it would be possible for a

seller to be treated as having received a different amount from the buyer for the asset from what
the buyer is credited (through his basis) with having paid.
157. An exception to this way of proceeding is suggested by Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire
Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
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had been treated in Year 1 as having a purchasing power of only $800.
This result is a straightforward consequence of the fact that the
purchasing power ascribed to the loan assumption in Year 1 assumed
a payback of $1000 at the end of Year 3 and necessarily made certain
assumptions about what the value of 1000 Year-3 dollars would be.
Things would become more complicated, however, if the purchasing
power of a Year-3 dollar differed from what had been anticipated in
Year 1. In that case, the satisfaction of the mortgage for $1000 at the
end of Year 3 would mean either that the buyer had not paid back the
entire amount that he had borrowed and therefore had, in effect,
benefitted from the discharge of some of his debt, or that he had paid
back more than he had borrowed. Under either description, the
payback might well trigger a response by the income tax system.
Embarking on a path that allows for the possibility that the face
value of the dollar will not always be treated by the tax system as a
fungible unit of measurement opens up a veritable Pandora's box of
practical and theoretical difficulties. Any system, like the federal income tax system, that ever measures what is taxed by comparing current value with previous value needs some standard to serve as a
common denominator. The dollar has traditionally served that purpose. As the preceding examples and discussion have shown, the bifurcation of a transaction that involves both the exchange of an asset
and the exchange of a liability into two distinct transactions does not
allow the dollar to play this role, nor does it suggest a ready substitute.
But this analysis has not attempted to articulate the practical or
policy issues surrounding the specific choices that the federal income
tax system might make with respect to the taxation of transactions
involving purchase money mortgages, much less to resolve them. It is
an effort, however, to provide a general conceptual framework within
which those issues can be identified, articulated, understood, and
debated.
IV.

POSTSCRIPT TO PARTS II AND III: WHEN

To RECONCILE

Each of the foregoing examples of reconciliation within the federal
income tax system illustrates how it functions as a corrective device.
Reconciliation involves the comparison of the actual current circumstances with a position taken on an earlier return with respect to some
potentially taxable amount. When it operates, it adjusts the current
year's taxable income if the comparison reveals that the earlier position presumed a future that is relevantly different from what actually
occurred. In this way it prevents at least some of the system's earlier
choices about the treatment of potentially taxable amounts from being
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irrevocable. At the same time, it determines whether and when to tax
that potentially taxable amount.
Although none of the foregoing examples focuses directly on the
question of when reconciliation might be appropriate, they certainly
suggest the beginnings of an answer. In each example, reconciliation
is invoked only when events have shown, once and for all, that some
presumption about the future that characterized an earlier year's treatment of a potentially taxable amount has proved incorrect. 5 8 The relevant future has in some sense been resolved.
Not surprisingly, given the connection between reconciliation and
the ultimate resolution of a contingent event, the identification of a
mistake that triggers reconciliation often coincides with the realization
of another potentially taxable amount. This is easily illustrated by my
discussion of section 1245 recapture.15 9 There, the event that made it
certain that the earlier years' depreciation had been excessive was the
sale of the depreciated asset. Any increase in the value of the asset was
realized at the same time. Similarly, in Examples A through
M(NR), 160 the final disposition of the loan made it certain that the
earlier year's report of taxable income hinged on a mistaken presumption about the future. That disposition occurred at the same time the
property securing the loan was sold or abandoned. In each instance,
the event triggering reconciliation was also the event marking the realization of any potentially taxable amounts arising from the appreciation of the asset.
The frequent identity of a reconciliation event and a realization
event has obscured the fact that reconciliation is different from realization and functions within our system as a separate and distinct means
for determining whether and when a potentially taxable amount will
be recognized. This is doubtless at least a part of the reason why the
conceptual vocabulary of the federal income tax system has not included reconciliation. Instead the system has struggled unsuccessfully
to account for all instances of taxation in terms of realization. This
aggrandizement of realization has, in turn, necessarily led us to ignore
the straightforward structural requirements common to any tax system, including one that purports to tax income. This essay is an effort
to begin to look directly at those requirements and their implications
for the structure of the federal system.
158. See White, supra note 9, at 502-05.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 98-121.

160. See supra section III.B.1.
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CONCLUSION

I have claimed here that there are certain necessary questions that
any tax system must ask. At the least, a system must make some determination about whether it considers an item within its aegis, and
for each such item, must determine whether to tax it, and, if so,
when.1 61 If this observation is correct, and I do not see how it cannot
be, then any tax system, including the federal income tax system, can
be described in terms that relate its particular features to the necessary
functions. We can expect that any system will have some means of
determining what falls within its province (even if that means is not
terribly systematic)1 62 and some means of determining whether things
within its compass will be taxed and when. In a simple system the
initial division will obviate the later whether question, and only the
when (now or later) question will remain.' 63 This paper begins to describe the federal income tax system in terms that relate its features to
these necessary functions.
The federal system is complex and does not neatly divide the
world, first into a pile of things that are potentially taxable and a pile
of things that are not, and then go about the task of deciding when to
tax the things in the first pile. Instead, it conceives of exclusion
(whether by initial exclusion or by deduction) from the tax base as a
possible response to those items included in the first pile. This means
that it asks the question whether to tax any item as well as the question
when to tax it after it has made some initial attempt at dividing the
world into two piles.164 More importantly, it also means that the normative goals that determine the federal system's tax base are not fully
specified by the criteria of initial division. Indeed, no criterion of initial division is ever really articulated by the system because it relies on
the answers to the whether and, to a lesser extent, the when questions
165
to determine the content of the tax base.
Any tax system, including the federal income tax system, will have
161. See supra text accompanying notes 10-21.
162. See supra text accompanying note 19.
163. Actually in the simplest sort of system there is no when question either; once an item is
identified, it is taxed. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
164. Some attempt at division seems to have been made, since our system does not ask the

whether and when to tax questions of everything in the world (my left big toe, for example). Or
perhaps it does include everything as within its scope and can be conceived instead as determining not to tax my big toe in answer to the whether question. If so, everything in the world that is
untaxed can be regarded as being potentially taxable and as having been excluded from the sys-

tem. The criteria for inclusion in the system's tax base would be identical to the criteria for
determining whether to tax. The general structural model is unaffected by this possible interpre-

tation of the federal system.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
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mechanisms for answering the whether and when to tax questions
which may be more or less systematic. The federal system explicitly
identifies realization as playing a central role in its determinations of
whether and when to tax. In fact, however, the federal system also
relies importantly on another, unarticulated, mechanism to make
these determinations. I call this mechanism "reconciliation."
Reconciliation has considerable descriptive and explanatory
power. Distinguishing it allows us to give a more coherent account of
a number of phenomena in the federal income tax system than we can
give with the traditional conceptual vocabulary. But it is important to
realize that coherence and rationality are only one (two?) of a variety
of aspirations that we might have for a tax system. Thus, whenever a
coherent account of an actual phenomenon within a system has implications for the description of certain other parts of the system, and the
further descriptions turn out not to fit the facts, we cannot simply assume that the best course would be either to reform or to interpret the
law so as to increase its coherence. Sometimes other, often competing,
values, such as administrability, equity, economic growth, or political
expediency are relevant to the question of what the law ought to be or
how it should be interpreted. Self-conscious articulation and exploration of those values and their importance ought to be a goal of normative discussion about the content of the income tax system.
The federal income tax system has become grotesquely complex.
On the one hand, the temptation to declare that it no longer has any
structural foundations is great. On the other hand, the importance of
a structure that can be looked to to help us understand what we have
and to provide us with a conceptual apparatus within which to focus
our critical and reforming efforts is also great. This paper is borne of
the belief that there is reason to pursue the latter course.

